Date: 09/27/> Page: 1

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
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17 April 1963 Executive Registry

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

- On 15 April, at DDP's request, I met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to brief them on major covert action developments since their previous briefing on 2 November 1962. The meeting lasted from 10:00 to 12:15.
- 2. At Mr. Murphy's request, I began with a description of our electoral operations as approved by the Special Group in Chile, the Dominican Republic, [11] and Guatemala. Mr. Murphy was particularly concerned with the situation in [11] and both he and Mr. Gray found it difficult to understand why the State Department continued to provide large-scale economic assistance when [[had to date refused to clean house of the Communists and fellow travelers both within the government and the labor movement. They were interested in knowing that we were in touch with some of the military leaders who are opposed to [6] and they seemed to feel that a military coup at some point might be preferable to allowing a 8, 11 Ito drift into the hands of the opposition. Both gentlemen wished to know the amounts that we had expended in these electoral operations and our own estimate of the results. They did not question either the need for intervention or the size of our effort; although in the Chilean case Mr. Murphy wanted to be sure that we had evidence that the funds passed through [8] hands actually reached the Chilean Christian Democrats.
- 3. Mr. Murphy then raised the [8] problem and said that he had been informed in New York that the State Department was putting considerable pressure on the [8] regime to persuade it to hold the elections scheduled for [9] 1903. He questioned the wisdom of this pressure, pointing out that there was a real danger of the [8] I returning to power if the elections were held. He asked our opinion and I said that, despite the pressure, there was still considerable doubt whether the elections would actually take place.

I added that the more responsible military were trying to work out with the [8] government and the non [8] political parties a formula which would prevent the [8] from making large gains on the national level.

- 4. On the subject of [11] Mr. Murphy felt that in so small a country action should be possible to remove [12] and wondered why it had not been done. I pointed out that we had as yet no policy approval for such action but that we were active in identifying and making contact with opposition elements both within [11] and in exile. I described some of the difficulties, such as [12] control of the arms in the palace and his widespread penetration of opposition plotting that had just resulted in the rolling up of a coup attempt by [13] army officers.
 - 5. Mr. Gray noted that he had seen in the newspapers a report of our recent decision to allow Radio Liberty to broadcast in Russian to the Soviet troops in Cuba. He was heartly in favor of such action but wondered how we were able to obtain approval of it when the Administration seems so anxious to avoid actions that might appear to be provocative to the Soviets. I informed him that here had, in fact, been some delay in obtaining the approval.
 - 6. Both the gentlemen asked for detailed information on the structure and workings of the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) and asked whether we felt this committee in any way hampered or interfered with the approval process in the Special Group. I said that both Chief, WH and myself were well pleased with the way the LAPC operates and believed it to be highly useful.
- 7. I then briefed them on actions which were taken in Southeast Asia, particularly the measure to strengthen the border police in the 10 I told them that [] was aware of these actions and they wanted to be certain Mr. [[] was clearly instructed prior to his departure [8].
- 8. Both men objected to press reports that certain Administration officials believed the Soviets to be exerting a helpful and restraining influence in Laos. I had to agree with them that it was hard to maintain such a view in the face of the increasing aggressiveness of the Pathet Lao, and I described the existing policy limits on our relations with [] and [] I then described the present state of the Soviet-Chinese

split and some of our efforts to exploit and exacerbate these tensions. Mr. Murphy asked for specific information on the extent of trade, if any, between China and the Soviet Union and the amount of the outstanding Chinese debt to the Soviets. I agreed to provide this via Mr. Coyne. Mr. Gray asked about the depth and extent of our intelligence from Peking and the China mainland, and was critical of the information supplied to us by the Chinese Nationalists. I said that intelligence operations in China were not my field but that I would make sure that a report on this did get to them.

- 9. I went on to describe the cultural ferment within Russia and recent action Khrushchev had taken to discipline the dissident writers and artists. They were very much interested in the actions we had taken to exploit this situation and particularly interested in the current issue of Encounter and in the account therein of the Khrushchev tirade at the recent art exhibition.
- 10. On Cuba I explained that I was not in a position to brief them in depth and any questions in this field would be handled by the Director or DDP. I did, however, brief them on the Krulak Committee and the recent meetings in Managua regarding measures that could be taken to limit the export of subversion from Cuba. (I have sent to them via Pat Coyne the CIA Memorandum on the present scope of the Cuban subversive training effort.)
- 11. I described the covert support to the [?] political parties for the forthcoming parliamentary election as approved by the Special Group. Mr. Murphy had not previously known of the decision to lend some selective support to the [?] and described this decision with some surprise "as quite a switch."
- 12. Finally, when informed of the policy limitations on our relations with the \(\)

3

13. The meeting was throughout a cordial one and I detected no evidence of a critical attitude towards the Agency's covert action program.

CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
Covert Action Staff

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