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SUMMARY OF AUGUST 6 AND 7, 1963 MEETING

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*25/12/98 [unclear]*

AUG 7 1964

MINUTES OF  
BOARD MEETING  
OF  
AUGUST 6 and 7, 1964

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no objection  
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8/6/98*

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*NSA equivalent  
may be released  
4/9/98  
[initials]*

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ANS 3-20-98

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA

August 5, 1964 All members + GPC were  
in Omaha except Baker and  
Thompson

1. 8:30 P.M. Depart Andrews AFB via Special Mission aircraft (Constellation)
2. 11:00 P.M., CST (approx.) Arrive Offutt AFB  
Remain overnight at Offutt Inn

August 6, 1964 All members except one above

Item	Time	Subject
1.	8:00 - 9:30	[REDACTED]
2.	9:30 - 10:00	Intelligence Warning
3.	10:30 - 11:00	Intelligence War Planning
4.	11:00 - 12:15	Soviet Bloc Threat <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Information Deficiencies</li> <li>b. Coverage Deficiencies</li> <li>c. Impact on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)</li> </ul>
5.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch
6.	1:00 - 2:00	Continue with Item 4
7.	2:00 - 2:30	[REDACTED]
8.	2:30 - 3:00	[REDACTED]
9.	3:10	Depart Offutt AFB
10.	9:10 (approx.)	Arrive Andrews AFB

August 7, 1964 All members here

1. 9:00 - 9:30 Chairman's Time
2. 9:30 - 10:15  
10:20 Current Intelligence Briefing on the Situations in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Communist China, Cyprus, Congo, Cuba

Mr. Ray Cline  
Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA  
with Mr. Hargraves  
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Agenda For August 7: (Continued)

Item      Time                      Subject

3.      10:15 - 12:15  
         11:45



4.      11:15 - 12:00  
         11:45

5.      12:00 - 12:45

Lunch - The White House Mess

6.      12:45 - 1:00  
         1:50 - 2:25

Executive Session *for Mr. Torkelly, Mr. Delmer, Mr. King*

7.      1:00 - 2:00

Audio Surveillance Collection and Counter-measures Efforts of the Intelligence Community;

a. USIB conclusions and recommendations on the organization and management of the effort

Mr. Tom Karamessines, CIA  
Mr. Robert Bannerman, CIA

b. Final USIB assessment of audio penetrations of U. S. Embassy, Moscow

Mr. Howard Osborn, CIA  
Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Department of State

8.      2:00 - 2:15

Executive Session

9.      2:15 - 3:15  
         2:40 - 3:30

Status Report on Developments Pertaining to the Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

with Col. Hymn, Col. Killion, Mr. Huffine  
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Agenda For August 7: (Continued)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Subject</u>
10.	3:15 - 4:00	Status Report on the Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations <i>Mr. Ash not covered</i>
11.	<i>3:30 5:15</i> 4:00 - 5:30	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence <i>Mr. John A. McCone with Mr. Kirk - Patrick</i>
12.	5:30 - End of Day	Executive Session

*Mr. Clifford; Mr. McCone will join the Board at 3:15 PM.*

- 13. *Admin. Notes - See pt. 4 of Memo to Chairman*
- 14. *Admin. Notes - See pt. 8 of Memo to Chairman*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*DoS  
Mr. [unclear]  
8/6/98  
[signature]*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: August 6-7, 1964, Meeting of the  
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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
August 6, 1964

The first day of this scheduled 2-day meeting of the Board was devoted to an all-day visit at SAC Headquarters, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska, on August 6. In attendance were Messrs. Clifford, Doolittle, Langer, Pace, Gray, Land, and Coyne. Board members Murphy and Baker were unable to join the meeting at SAC.

August 7, 1964

On the second day of its meeting the Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on August 7 at the Board's offices in the Executive Office Building, Washington, D. C. Present were Messrs. Clifford, Doolittle, Murphy, Langer, Pace, Baker and Gray; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash. (Board member Land joined the meeting a little later on.)

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[REDACTED]

Mr. Gray asked for the DCI's views on the capability of the intelligence estimating mechanism to avoid being influenced by the wishful thinking of responsible officials, as in the case of the erroneous estimate on Cuba prior to the Soviet missile crisis in 1962. Mr. McCone said that a better example than Cuba was the estimate on Brazil which was bitterly resisted by people in Government who nevertheless later saw the accuracy of the estimate proved by developments.

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[REDACTED]

In response to Mr. Murphy's query about Cuba, the DCI said that an estimated 5,000 Soviets had departed since May 1, leaving 2,000 on the island. The Cubans now have control of air defense and coastal defense but the question is whether they have unlimited control of the SAM sites.

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[REDACTED]

Mr. McCone and Mr. Kirkpatrick departed the meeting at 5:10 p.m.

At 5:20 p.m. the Board adjourned, closing its 2-day meeting.

*a*  
A. R. Ash

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

August 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Audiosurveillance Collection and Countermeasures  
Efforts of the Intelligence Community

In Executive Session Mr. Ash will brief the Board on significant developments relating to the subject which members may wish to keep in mind when USIB representatives discuss the matter with the Board.

Following Mr. Ash's briefing, Mr. Tom Karamessines, Assistant to CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, and Mr. Robert Bannerman of CIA's Deputy Directorate for Support, will brief the Board on the U. S. Intelligence Board's conclusions and recommendations on the organization and management of the audiosurveillance effort. (On June 26, 1964 following the Board's recommendations to the President, Mr. Bundy requested the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of the USIB, to present coordinated proposals for the most effective possible organization, management, and coordination of the intelligence community's resources and capabilities for research and development, and the operational application, of techniques for audiosurveillance collection and audiosurveillance countermeasures. The organization and management aspects of this problem are indicated by the fact that under present arrangements: (1) research and development of audiosurveillance collection and countermeasure devices and techniques are pursued separately by State, Defense and CIA; (2) the coordination of audiosurveillance collection operations is the responsibility of the FBI in the U. S., and is the responsibility of the DCI overseas; and (3) the coordination of audiosurveillance countermeasures activities is the responsibility of an NSC interagency committee chaired by the Department of State.)

Next Mr. Howard Osborne, Director of CIA's Office of Security, and Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of Security at the Department of State, will bring the Board up to date on the USIB's final assessment of the audio and electromagnetic penetrations of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow which were discovered in April.

(At the last meeting the Board was provided with results of USIB's preliminary assessment of damage caused by these

*Not taken up at August Meeting*

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penetrations. Subsequent to the last meeting the President requested the Chairman, USIB, to provide a final assessment of damage in time for consideration by the Board at its August 6-7 meeting.)

*J. P. Coyne*  
J. P. Coyne

Addendum: Enclosed for the information of the Board is a memorandum entitled "Bugging of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow" which was submitted to the Chairman by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, following his oral presentation to the Board subsequent to his on-the-scene examination of developments at the Embassy in Moscow.

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June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Clark M. Clifford  
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board

SUBJECT: Bugging of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow

During my recent trip to Moscow I visited the American Embassy and had a number of conversations with Mr. Musser who has the responsibility for assuring that the building is secure against listening devices. I also examined a number of key offices in the Embassy building, including several in which microphones had been found, and examined the special secure rooms that have recently been installed. I formed the following judgments regarding the present situation.

1. There is no convincing basis for concluding that additional listening systems do not exist in the building.

2. The soundproof rooms and the special room containing the teletype equipment appear to be secure, though the former are not electrically shielded. The lack of shielding is probably not serious because the rooms are in the interior of the building and under guard at all times so that the use of microphones or of electromagnetic listening devices in them would be extremely difficult.

3. The physical security of the building seemed a bit less than adequate. For example, it was possible for us to go in and out of the room housing the telephone switchboard with no one but the telephone operator--who I believe was a Russian girl--seeing us. I understand that at night no one is in the room. Physical security is complicated somewhat by the fact that the building is also the residence for Embassy employees and by the fact that the local guard staff is very small; none the less this is a problem that should receive attention.

4. Mr. Musser is extremely competent but the task at the Embassy is more than any one person could handle at this time.

I would recommend the following measures:

1. Provide Musser with some assistance. He has had some help from the American forces in Germany from time to

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time but when I was there he was working by himself. Because of the housing shortage the Embassy is reluctant to add to the staff. The fact is, as I have already said, in spite of Musser's outstanding ability he cannot do the job that now must be done without substantial continuing assistance. He also needs additional equipment.

2. A very complete physical examination must be made of any room that is to be used for confidential conversations. This should include x-ray or neutron examination of the walls, floors and ceilings if possible. Possibly other techniques can be found which would also help locate hidden equipment.

3. If x-ray examination is not feasible, physical examination of the outside of the building should be considered.

4. In critical areas new wall surfaces should be provided. Expert advice is needed to determine whether plastering or paneling would provide the best protection.

5. Dr. Land's proposal for inducing masking sounds into the walls should be pursued. It should be possible to introduce such sounds directly into the walls without creating objectionable sound levels in the rooms. This should be investigated before a decision is made regarding new wall covering.

6. Screening should be provided against electromagnetic-reflection listening devices.

7. The possibility of providing continuous monitors for signals from such devices should be investigated.

8. More effort should be made to understand the purpose of the microwave signal directed at the Embassy, or failing in this, to stop it. It is hard to understand why we have been so unconcerned about it.

9. An effort should be made to insure that the telephone system cannot be used as a distribution system for listening devices.


10. I understand that head sets and microphones exist that permit secure conversations. Though they may be awkward they should be used for confidential discussions held outside of the secure rooms until greater confidence can be established in the security of the building.

11. I believe that there is a desperate need for a

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professional group in the government to develop protective techniques for our embassies. Such a group should work with or at least have full access to a group whose task is to develop sophisticated penetration devices so that its work is effectively directed against all of the real threats that can be imagined.

  
Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner

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