

## SELBET

U.S. NON PAPER ON THE REPROCESSING OF U.S. ORIGIN MATERIAL AND THE USE OF PLUTONIUM

5. PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES TO ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES IS A FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY-08JECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS ADMINISTRATION RECOGNIZES THAT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN PROMOTING THIS OBJECTIVE IS THE STRENGTHENING OF THE POSITION OF THE U.S. AS A RELIABLE AND PREDICTABLE TRADE PARTNER IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD UNDER EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS.

6. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF JULY 16, 1981. ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND NON-PROLIFERATION UNDERLINED THESE TWO BASIC THENES OF U.S. POLICY. IN THAT STATEMENT, PRESIDENT REAGAN STATED INTER ALTA:

- THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO INMIBIT THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR MATERIAL. EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY. PARTICULARLY WHERE THE DANGER OF PROLIFERATION DEMANOS: AND

- THE U.S. WILL NOT INHIBIT OR SET BACK CIVIL REPROCESSING AND BREEDER REACTOR DEVELOPMENT ABROAD IN MATIONS WITH ADVANCED NUCLEAR POWER SECRET

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
PROGRAMS WHERE IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PROLIFERATION RISK.

7. THE PRESIDENT ALSO INSTRUCTED THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WORKING WITH OTHER RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES, TO GIVE PRIORITY-ATTENTION TO EFFORTS TO REDUCE PROLIFERATION RISKS, TO ENHANCE THE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME AND CONSISTENT WITH U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS, TO REESTABLISH A LEADERSHIP ROLE FOR THE U.S. IN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AFFAIRS.

8. UNDER THAT MANDATE A NUMBER OF REVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED INCLUDING ONE CONCERNING APPROACHES TO DEVELOP MORE PREDICTABLE POLICY FOR EXERCISING U.S. RIGHTS TO APPROVE REPROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM USE.

9. THIS REVIEW HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETED. THE PRESIDENT

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HAS DECIDED TO OFFER JAPAN AND EURATOM COUNTRIES A MORE REALISTIC, PREDICTABLE AND SECURE BASIS UPON UHICH TO PLAN THOSE ASPECTS OF THEIR NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS WHICH INVOLVE THE REPROCESSING OF U.S.-SUPPLIED MATERIAL AND THE SUBSEQUENT USE OF THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCED FROM SUCH-MATERIAL. IT RECOGNIZES THAT PLUTONIUM IS NECESSARY FOR BREEDER DEVELOPMENT AND MAY BECOME A VALUABLE ENERGY SOURCE IN SOME COUNTRIES. IT ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT SOME OF OUR ALLIES BELIEVE DEPLOYMENT OF BREEDER REACTORS AND POSSIBLE RECYCLE OF PLUTONIUM IN THEMMAL REACTORS IS IMPORTANT TO THEIR ENERGY. SECURITY-AND MAY BE ECONOMICALLY YIABLE AT AN EARLIER DATE JHAN IN THE U.S. AND THAT JUDGMENTS AS AS TO NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM CONTENT IN THEIR COUNTRIES ARE MATTERS FOR THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS.

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10. THE NEW APPROACH ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT OUR ALLIES REQUIRE GREATER PREDICTABLILITY FROM US IN HOW ME INTEND TO EXERCISE OUR CONSENT RIGHTS WITH REGARD TO THEIR REPROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM USE PROGRAMS.

11. (NOTE PARAS 11 THRU 14 ARE FOR TOKYO ONLY.)

ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO OFFER:

(A) AN ADVANCE CONSENT ARRANGEMENT FOR CERTAIN
REPROCESSING AND USE
OF U.S.-CONTROLLED MATERIAL IN PROGRAMS FOR WHICH
INFORMATION WILL ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE
THE NECESSARY STATUTORY DETERMINATIONS, AND

(B) A STATEMENT OF INTENTION TO APPROVE USE OF SUCH MATERIAL IN FUTURE PROGRAMS IN JAPAN AND RETRANSFERS FOR REPROCESSING TO EURATON OR OTHER MUTUALLY AGREED COUNTRIES IN FUTURE FACILITIES WHEN SUFFICIENT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE THE NECESSARY STATUTORY DETERMINATIONS.

12. (FOR TOKYO ONLY.) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT AN ADVANCE CONSENT ARRANGEMENT COULD INCLUDE RETRANSFER OF SPENT FUEL FROM JAPAN TO FACILITIES IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGOOM FOR REPROCESSING. REPROCESSING AT THE TOKAI-MURA PLANT FOR ITS OPERATIVE LIFE; USE OF PLUTONIUM IN

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JAPAN'S BREEDER. ADVANCE REACTOR AND THERMAL RECYCLE PROGRAMS AND RETURN OF SEPARATED PLUTONIUM FROM FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR THESE PROGRAMS.

13. (FOR TOKYO ONLY) FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS FOR WHICH SUFFICIENT INFORMATION IS NOT NOW AVAILABLE TO MAKE SUCH DETERMINATIONS, WE INTEND TO APPROVE THESE PROGRAMS WHEN THE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO ALLOW US TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DETERMINATIONS. THIS COULD INCLUDE THE SECOND REPROCESSING PLANT, AND USE OF PLUTONIUM IN SECRET

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FUTURE BREEDER REACTORS ADVANCED REACTOR AND THERMAL RECYCLE PROGRAMS.

14. (FOR TOKYO ONLY) THE UMITED STATES PROPOSES TO INCORPORATE THIS LONG TERM SETTLEMENT IN A NEW OR AMENDED AGREEMENT FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH A LIFETIME OF UP TO 30 YEARS. FOR APPROVALS UNDER THE ADVANCE CONSENT ARRANGEMENT (PARA 11. (A) AUDVEY) THERE WOULD BE NO REQUIREMENTS FOR FUNTHER JAPANESE REQUESTS FOR U.S. APPROVAL FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES DURING THE LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT. THESE APPROVALS WILL BE SUBJECT TO ITHE CONDITIONS IN THE AGREEMENT CONTINUING TO BE MET. INCLUDING NECESSARY NON-PROLIFERATION AND STATUTORY CONDITIONS SUCH AS THOSE ON SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY, AND TO A CONTINUED STRONG COMMITMENT BY JAPAN TO NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS.


1S. (NOTE PARAS IS THRU 16 ARE FOR EURATOM AND ECCAPITALS ONLY.) THE U.S. DESIRES TO PUT ITS NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP WITH EURATOM ON A MORE ORDERLY AND PREDICTABLE BASIS. ACCORDINGLY, AS PART OF A NEW OR AMENDED AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE

A) AN ADVANCE CONSENT ARRANGEMENT FOR REPROCESSING AMD FOR THE USE OF PLUTONIUM IN PROGRAMS FOR WHICH INFORMATION WILL ALLOW THE U.S. TO MAKE THE MECESSARY STATUTORY DETERMINATIONS. UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT, THERE MOULD BE NO REQUIREMENTS FOR FURTHER REQUESTS FOR U.S. APPROVAL FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES DURING THE LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT.

B) A STATEMENT OF INTENTION TO APPROVE THE REPROCESSING OF U.S.-ORIGIN MATERIAL AND THE USE OF PLUTONTUM PRODUCED FROM SUCH MATERIAL IN FUTURE PROGRAMS AND FACILITIES WHEN

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SUFFICIENT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO ALLOW THE UNITED SECRET

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STATES TO MAKE THE NECESSARY STATUTORY DETERMINATIONS.

16. (FOR EURATOM AND EC CAPITALS ONLY) THESE APPROVALS MILL BE SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS—IN THE AGREEMENT CONTINUING TO BE NET, INCLUDING NECESSARY NON-PROLIFERATION AND STATUTORY CONDITIONS SUCH AS THOSE ON SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY, AND TO A CONTINUED STRONG COMMITTENT BY EURATOM COUNTRIES TO NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS.


17. THIS APPROACH—ON REPROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM USE WILL BE LIMITED TO THOSE COOPERATING PARTNERS MAICH HAVE ADVANCED NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND WHICH POSSESS OUTSTANDING NON-PROLIFERATION CREDENTIALS AND WHERE SUCH ACTIVITIES DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PROLIFERATION RISK, I.E. EURATON AND JAPAN. THESE COUNTRIES WILL BE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH DETAILED INFORMATION ON THEIR MUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND POLICIES, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THOSE INVOLVING REPROCESSING AND THE USE OF PLUTONIUM. WE WILL ALSO WISH TO HAVE INFORMATION ON THE SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEMS IN EFFECT. SHASED ON THIS INFORMATION AND CONSISTENT WITH OUR STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE APPROVAL'S AS DESCRIBED ABOVE

18. THE PROPOSALS SET FORTH HERE ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE OUR ALLIES WITH A MORE PREDICTABLE AND RELIABLE BASIS ON WHICH TO PLAN THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. THEY ARE ALSO DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE THE DISPUTES THAT HAVE AT TIMES DISTRACTED US FROM MORE PRESSING PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS.

19. CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC CONCERN OVER THE SPREAD OF SENSITIVE MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY REMAINS STRONG. NEW OR AMENDED AGREEMENTS OR U.S. APPROVALS FOR REPROCESSING MUST BE PUT BEFORE CONGRESS FOR REVIEW. ME CAN EXPECT CRITICISM TO THE EXTENT OUR POSITION IS PERCEIVED AS SOFTENING OF NON-PROLIFERATION CONDITIONS OR AS ESTABSECRET SECRET

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LISING AN UNDESTRABLE PRECEDENT FOR OTHER CASES.





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