

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file*

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December 13, 1962

TO: Mr. Bundy

SUBJECT: Message from Mr. Helms -  
Mongoose

The recommendations in the attached memorandum have been approved and CIA is going ahead with the plan.

*GC*  
Gordon Chase

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

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By MMK NARA, Date 2/7/62

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<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Deputy Director (Plans)		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
<p>Remarks:</p> <div style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;">  </div> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>FOR YOUR SIGNATURE</b></p> <p style="font-size: small; text-align: center;">             Decl: scified under the provisions              of the JFK Assassination Records              Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-528)           </p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
C/TFW - GG 2708			7 Dec 62
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By: DOMT NARA, Date 5/1/63

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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Deputy Director (Plans)

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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FORWARDED

1. Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence

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3. Director Central Intelligence  
& d 56 07 HQS

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By MMK NARA Date 1/0/01

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SENSITIVE

7 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE--Support  
of Assets Inside Cuba

1. This memorandum is for your information and a request for action is contained in paragraph 9.

2. Since 26 October 1962 and the initiation of the "stand down" on any action operations including maritime operations, operational activity to support our internal assets has been deferred; however, we must provide support in the near future to the AMTORRID team in Oriente and the COBRA team in Pinar del Rio if they are to remain effective. The AMTORRID team in particular is in serious jeopardy of compromise if the principal agent is not exfiltrated at an early date.

3. The AMTORRID team, consisting of five men, was infiltrated into southern Oriente in June 1962. The team leader was exfiltrated at his request in July 1962; and, in September 1962 three other members of the team (including the W/T operator) were exfiltrated and a new radio operator infiltrated. The remaining team member and the W/T operator established their base in the Santiago de Cuba area, and have developed an extensive intelligence collection network among legal residents throughout Oriente province. Recently the team leader has repeatedly stated that due to security problems he cannot remain in place. The W/T operator has requested to be replaced.

4. The COBRA team, consisting of a principal agent and a radio operator, was infiltrated in southern Pinar del Rio on 12 March 1962. Its mission was to collect information and to organize resistance elements. The team has received two maritime resupplies totalling 2,000 lbs. of arms and demolitions. The principal agent (who had been

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By hmmk NARA, Date 8/17/78

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the leader of a resistance group in Pinar del Rio prior to the Playa Giron invasion) has established a well compartmented intelligence collection/resistance network which has approximately twenty sub-agents and several hundred members or cooperating contacts. Two members of the organization were exfiltrated in September and have received specialized training and are awaiting re-infiltration.

5. Prior to infiltration the teams were trained for both intelligence and resistance missions. When infiltrated, W/T communications and suitable 1:50,000 scale maps in addition to other necessary equipment was provided thus enabling the teams to pin-point their information and rapidly transmit it. In addition, headquarters has been able to quickly re-contact the teams for clarification of previous reports, to levy new requirements, or to undertake new activities.

6. A survey of their messages reveals that out of a total of 320 approximately 70% contained raw intelligence, while the remainder were primarily operational data. In some cases the raw intelligence in two or more messages was combined into a single report resulting in a total of sixty reports disseminated. Attachment A to this memorandum cites specific instances of COBRA and AMTORRID intelligence reporting which provided the early collateral information on various Soviet activities, missile related installations and IL-28 jet bombers. In several instances their reports provided the stimulus for aerial reconnaissance of certain areas and NPIC read-out of these areas. Attachments B and C identify significant reports from each team.

7. In addition to their intelligence collection capabilities, both teams possess a limited paramilitary capability. During the recent crisis, these capabilities supplemented by additional assets held in Florida enabled the Agency to satisfactorily respond to the CINCLANT Unconventional Warfare Requirements levied upon the Agency by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8. In summary, both teams have developed extensive proven nets capable of providing significant information. Both teams, and especially the COBRA team, have demonstrated stayability as well as a capability for continued growth. As the hope of U. S. military intervention diminishes, active participation in the net will probably

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decline; but, as long as the leadership remains intact and receives external support, there is reason to believe that the nets can continue to produce. Without this support, we believe the effectiveness of the nets will be radically reduced, if not totally destroyed.

9. It is, therefore, requested that the following support operations be authorized:

a. AMTORRID

Infiltrate on the south coast of Oriente province near Santiago de Cuba a principal agent and W/T operator plus the necessary radio equipment and a small amount of other equipment including arms. At the same time, exfiltrate the present principal agent, his radio operator, and possibly one or more members of the net.

b. COBRA

Infiltrate on the south coast of Pinar del Rio two members of the net previously exfiltrated plus an additional radio operator and a limited quantity of equipment and arms. Exfiltrate one or more members of the net for additional training.

*RH*  
RICHARD HELMS  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachments: 3

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RICHARD HELMS  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachments: 3

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INTELLIGENCE REPORTING BY ILLEGAL INFILTRERS WHICH PROVIDED THE EARLY COLLATERAL INFORMATION ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES, MISSILE-RELATED INSTALLATIONS AND BEAGLE IL-28 JET BOMBERS. 22 August - 30 November 1962

COBRA

1. On 22 August 1962 COBRA reported a Soviet encampment at Malas Aguas, northeast of Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province. On 29 August this installation was confirmed and officially designated as the Santa Lucia SAM Site.
2. On 11 September 1962 the source reported Soviet personnel had been observed in construction activities near Colon and La Sierra; this had been confirmed, on 29 August 1962, as a Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Site in the early stages of construction.
3. On 12 October 1962 COBRA reported the influx of Soviet personnel and the establishment of an installation on the Chaco finca. This installation was confirmed between 14-19 October as the San Cristobal surface-to-surface missile site designated as Santa Cruz de los Pinos MRBM #1.
4. On 16 October 1962 the source reported additional information on a second San Cristobal MRBM site and the observation of crates being transported to San Julian. Investigation confirmed the crates in question as the delivery of crated, semi-assembled IL-28 Beagle jet aircraft to the San Julian airbase.
5. Upon guidance from Headquarters COBRA assets were dispersed to observe dismantling activities, or the abstinence thereof, of offensive weapons installations. An example of this reporting is reflected on 25 October 1962 of the Soviet camps in Santa Cruz de los Pinos. This installation was confirmed as a surface-to-surface missile site designated as San Cristobal MRBM #3. Demonstrative of COBRA assets to collect raw intelligence on Cuban-Soviet installations was the emphatic reporting that the La Coloma missile site was definitely not being dismantled. Having discovered the precise locations of the Santa Lucia and the La Coloma SAM sites through their own collection efforts, COBRA sources continued observation of the La Coloma SA-2 site and were not, in this case, differentiating between a surface-to-air missile and a surface-to-surface missile site. This does, however, manifest the aggressive collection of these assets.

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6. On 6 November 1962 the COBRA assets reported removal of materiel from San Julian air base and the Santa Cruz de los Pinos (San Cristobal MRBM #3 missile site); and as late as 30 November 1962 continued reporting on materiel being transported from the San Julian air base to the Soviet installation at Guatana, and affirmed that Cuban Communists were being trained by Spanish speaking Soviets at this base. The Guatana installation had been confirmed as a SAM assembly/support area.

AMTORRID

1. On 20 September 1962 AMTORRID reported a Soviet tent camp of 250 Russians undertaking excavations as preliminary construction activities. On 2 October 1962 an AMTORRID asset reported this area had been designated a restricted military zone. This installation was confirmed as the Cabanas SA-2 (SAM) missile site on 15 October 1962.

2. AMTORRID reported that on 23 September 1962 a convoy of 42 vehicles which included seven missile carriers was destined for Mayari Arriba. On 3 October 1962 continued construction of an underground installation near Mayari Arriba was reported. SA-2 missile carriers, missile cannisters, and related missile equipment were confirmed at Mayari Arriba on 17 October 1962.

3. On 8 September 1962 AMTORRID assets reported a train transporting armored tanks left Nicaro 18 September 1962 for San German. At 1000 hours, 21 September 1962, a train left Santiago de Cuba transporting approximately 25 crates of missiles and associated radar equipment which arrived at Manzanillo at 1200 hours. A new military installation was confirmed near San German approximately 17 November 1962. A SA-2 (SAM) site was confirmed at Manzanillo between 15-18 October 1962.

4. On 8 October 1962 a missile "with a 1000-mile effective range" was reported transported from Santiago de Cuba headed for Palma Soriano.

5. The possibility of storing missiles at the Pepus cave was reported on 8 October 1962. On 17 November 1962 a cave entrance or underground bunker under construction was confirmed at the site indicated by the source as Pepus cave.

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6. AMTORRID reported having received, on 6 November 1962, information that a Soviet base, on the road to El Cobre from Santiago de Cuba, had increased efforts to complete construction of a missile base. On 15 October 1962 this installation had been confirmed as the Santiago de Cuba SAM assembly/support area.

7. An AMTORRID asset reported, on 7 November 1962, that he had observed during several sights military convoys carrying arms, and some trailer trucks transporting missiles heading past Siboney towards the mountains, "which were put in large caves," affirming "all work being done by Soviet personnel."

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ATTACHMENT B

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS BASED ON COLLECTION BY COBRA ASSETS

1. In a compilation of several reports disseminated as TDCSB 3/652,383 on 29 November, the source reported transfer of materiel from the San Julian airbase to Guatana on the following dates: 18 November 1962, 20 November 1962, 21 November 1962, 22 November 1962, 23 November 1962, 24 November 1962, and 25 November 1962. In two instances the source reported the cargo being transferred, including arms or aircraft parts, inside gray-colored crates. Previously, the source had reported the delivery of gray-colored crates to San Julian which were later confirmed as the delivery of the IL-29 Beagle jet bombers. On 29 November the source reported Spanish-speaking Soviets were giving instructions to Cuban communists. Guatana has been confirmed as a surface-to-air (SAM) missile assembly/support area. Since both Beagle aircraft and a SAM site have been confirmed at San Julian, it is possible materiel being transferred would include SAM and that Cuban nationals possibly may be receiving instructions in their function and operation at Guatana. (TDCSB 3/530,481), 4 Dec 62.

2. COBRA advised all observation posts have confirmed the removal of aircraft from San Julian during 30 November, 1 December, and 2 December. The aircraft fuselage was transported intact. On 25 November 1962 first indications of disassembling of IL-28's were confirmed. On 30 November 1962 IL-28 aircraft were still at San Julian but on 1 December 1962 IL-28 fuselages and crates were confirmed at Mariel port facilities. (TDCS 3/530,481), 4 Dec 62.

3. Dismantling, as of 25 November 1962, of Missile Sites at San Diego de los Banos, Santa Cruz de los Pinos; Weapons relocated to Seboruco, and Hacienda El Mameyal; Excavations and Construction at Guatana for Underground Storage. (These are San Cristobal MRBM Sites 1, 2, and 3. Guatana is a confirmed SAM Assembly/Support Area). (TDCS 3/529,480), 27 Nov 62.

4. Reaction to current crisis.  
(TDCSDB 3/652,313), 24 Nov 62.

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By MMK NARA, Date 8/17/81

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5. Military equipment from Soviet installation near Caleta Grande removed through the dock facilities. Later materiel (unknown if same equipment) stored in Colony Hotel in Siguatepeque. Materiel stored at airfield transferred to Sierra de la Siguatepeque. A surface-to-air missile site has been confirmed north of Siguatepeque airfield. Soviet personnel believed quartered at Colony Hotel. A surface-to-surface (SSM) cruise missile site has been confirmed immediately west of Sierra de la Siguatepeque, and NPIC has confirmed at least 7 tunnel entrances in Sierra de la Siguatepeque, which may possibly be related as storage facilities to the SSM and SAM sites. (TDCS 3/529,402), 24 Nov 62.

6. COBRA reported transfer of crated equipment on 31 October 1962, 1 November 1962, 2 November 1962, 3 November 1962, and 4 November 1962 following the dismantling of Soviet installations at Los Palacios, Santa Cruz, de los Pinos, San Cristobal, and San Diego de los Baños. These are officially designated San Cristobal MRBM sites Nos. 1, 2, and 3. (TDCS 3/527,931).

7. Removal of Material from San Julian Air Base, Santa Cruz de los Pinos, and Loma del Toro. (Beagles confirmed at San Julian, Santa Cruz de los Pinos is San Cristobal MRBM Site 3). (TDCS 3/527,575), 6 Nov 62.

8. Soviets reported removing crates, cranes, and materiel at night from installations at Santa Cruz de los Pinos and Loma del Toro during night of 22 October 1962. Explosives were transported from San Julian by Soviets. Santa Cruz de los Pinos is San Cristobal MRBM site No. 3. IL-28 and a SAM site had been confirmed at San Julian. (TDCS 3/527,575), 6 Nov 62.

9. Soviet personnel and rumored missile site on finca north of Santa Cruz de los Pinos, Pinar del Rio Province; Soviet troops at Aspiro. (Santa Cruz de los Pinos in San Cristobal MRBM Site No. 3; Aspiro is area of San Cristobal Site No. 3). (TDCS 3/562,356), 26 Oct 62.

10. Che Guevara and the General Staff of Pinar del Rio military were reported to have established headquarters at Corral de la Palma, Pinar del Rio province. (TDCS 3/526,333), 25 Oct 62.

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11. On 12 October 1962 COBRA reported Soviet camps on the Cacho finca at Los Palacios. On 18 October 1962 COBRA reported the transport of crates 35-45 feet in length, grey colored, at the San Julian airbase. On 15 October 1962 COBRA reported a missile site at San Julian. The Cacho finca is officially designated as the San Cristobal MRBM site No. 1. The crates being transported were confirmed on 17 October 1962 as the delivery of IL-28's to San Julian. A surface-to-air missile site has been confirmed immediately South of the San Julian landing strip. (TDCSDB 3/651,783), 19 Oct 62.

12. Soviet personnel reported to have disembarked at Caleta Grande, Isla de Pinos 5-6 October 1962. Militia installations were reported at Loma la Canada and tunnels in the slopes of the hill. (TDCS 3/525,431), 17 Oct 62.

13. Soviet installations reported at Mina Leal, Sierra de la Sigüanea; numerous tunnels excavated in Sierra de la Sigüanea; and the presence of Soviet Bloc personnel at Mina Leal and Caleta Grande. There has been confirmation of rolling stock at Sierra de la Sigüanea and Mina Leal and six separate tunnels have been confirmed at the foot of Sierra de la Sigüanea. A Cruise surface-to-surface missile site has been confirmed approximately one kilometer west of the tunnel entrances at Sierra de la Sigüanea. (TDCS 3/524,998), 12 Oct 62.

14. Cubans relocated from Sigüanea airfield. Military equipment stored between Sigüanea airfield and highway and, on 13-15 September 1962, approximately 400 Soviet personnel observed at the airfield. Soviet personnel quartered in Hotel Coloney at Playa Roja (Sigüanea) and materiel transported from mainland by water transport to the old Sigüanea yacht basin. Evidence of new defense security around Hotel Coloney indicates Soviet personnel possibly confirmed in that facility. New docking facilities have been confirmed in the Sigüanea Yacht Basin and Special Intelligence have indicated "secret war materiel" being escorted to this coastal region of Isla de Pinos. Materiel in open storage confirmed between the Sigüanea landing strip and the highway later identified as a surface-to-air missile site. (TDCS 3/524,636) 10 Oct 62.

15. On 4 October 1962 Soviet technicians were reported to have established residency in houses 5-3/4 kilometers northeast of Sigüanea. Additional Soviet personnel were reported to have established an installation between the north terminal of the Sigüanea airfield and the highway. The Soviet installation at the Sigüanea airfield was confirmed on 29 September 1962 as a SAM site. (TDCS 3/524,444), 6 Oct 62.

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16. A Soviet Bloc encampment, on 9 October 1962 and 10 October 1962, was reported approximately 4.1 kilometers north northeast of La Coloma along the bank of the Rio Brazo de Enrique.

On 29 August 1962 an SA-2 (SAM) missile site was confirmed at this installation, officially designated the La Coloma SAM site. (TDCS 3/522,931), 20 Sept 62.

17. On 23 August 1962 COBRA reported that of the Soviet Bloc personnel that disembarked at Mariel, over 400 were in a camp along the La Coloma highway (to Pinar del Rio city). (WAVE 7364, IN 48991, 23 August 1962; and WAVE 7438, IN 49907, 23 August 1962). The Soviet installation at La Guatana, on the La Coloma highway to Pinar del Rio city, confirmed 19 October 1962, has been officially designated as the Pinar del Rio surface-to-air missile assembly/support site. (TDCS 3/521,080).

18. A convoy of Soviet Bloc personnel and equipment passed through Trinidad, Las Villas Province, apparently coming from the Casilda Port area. This convoy may possibly have been related to the Cienfuegos SAM site, northwest of Trinidad. (CS-3/521,748), 10 Sept 62.

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REPRODUCTION OF THE JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992 (PL 102-326)  
By MMK NARA, Date 8/17/92

ATTACHMENT C

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS BASED ON COLLECTION BY AMTORRID ASSETS

1. On 24 November 1962, AMTORRID reported missiles being transported on a train which passed through Alto Songo at 2100 hours, 24 November 1962 headed for Guantanamo; at 2030 hours, 24 November 1962 trailer trucks were observed transiting Yerba Guinea, headed for Guantanamo, each of which was carrying a missile approximately 20 feet long. These missiles may have been headed for the Maldonado SAM site, west of Guantanamo. (TDCS-3/529,702; 28 November 1962)

2. On 24 November 1962, AMTORRID reported a Soviet missile base at Rio Arriba. Missiles were described as being in place in revetted slots, and defended by anti-aircraft weapons. Soviets were transported through Vilorio on 21 November 1962. AMTORRID had reported that on approximately 15 November 1962 the Soviets had initiated this installation, and described equipment present as including ten trailers, 15 missile carriers, two anti-aircraft guns, 2-3000 Soviets, 20 field tents, one microwave base antenna, and four radar units in operation, with other radar units not assembled. Other Soviets reportedly were on the Fernandez ranch three or four kilometers from this installation. (TDCS-3/529,708; 28 November 1962). The above installation, described by the source as between Baltony Central and Rio Arriba, has been officially designated as the Maldonado SAM site. In reference to Soviets transported through Vilorio, Vilorio is within the immediate area of what has been officially been designated as the Cabanas SAM site, which has been disassembled and relocated as the Maldonado SAM site.

3. Transport of mobilized militiamen at La Fe, Victoria de las Tunas, Santiago de Cuba and Siboney, Oriente province; Soviets and Soviet rockets transported to caves in Siboney area. A SAM assembly/support area has been confirmed at the Victoria de las Tunas area. (TDCS-3/529,299; 26 November 1962).

4. Between 2300 hours, 22 October 1962 and 0100 hours, 23 October 1962 Cuban Army vehicles were moving towards Guantanamo transporting militia personnel. (TDCS-3/525,965; 25 October 1962).

5. Political reaction in Cuba. (TDCSDB-3/652,313; 23 November 1962).

6. On 16 November 1962, military personnel were transported from the Santiago de Cuba refinery towards the coast; approximately 100 trucks transported militiamen to a hill one kilometer south of El Cristo. On 18 November 1962, six, fifteen and six trucks transported ground forces personnel toward El Caney, Guantaso, and El Cristo, respectively. (TDCS-3/529,143; 22 November 1962).

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7. Mobilized militia personnel of Division 50 reportedly were returned to Baragua from Guantanamo, and were to be returned to Guantanamo on 14 or 15 November 1962. (TDCS 3/528,927), 21 Nov 62.

8. Rumored that Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara has a serious argument in which Anastas I. Mikoyan had to intervene. (TDCS 3/528,850), 20 Nov 62.

9. Raul Castro arrived in Vilorio, Oriente Province, in 13 November 1962. Vilorio camp secured by wire fence, near Ermita Central; Rocket launching site at La Fe; Missiles transported to Mayari Arriba; Soviets access to air shuttle facilities at Santiago de Cuba Airfield. (The former Cabanas SAM site is in immediate proximity of Vilorio; a SAM Support/Assembly area has been confirmed at Mayari Arriba. (TDCS 3/528,769), 20 Nov 62.

10. Cuban troop movements at Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo. (TDCS 3/528,701), 17 Nov 62.

11. Military objectives northwest of Santiago de Cuba. Confirmed SAM support/assembly area. (TDCS 3/528,552) 16 Nov 62.

12. Soviet base at Sabana finca; missiles delivered to the base. Confirmed SAM support/assembly area at Santiago de Cuba. (TDCS 3/528,509) 15 Nov 62.

13. Soviets engaged in construction of Rocket base, 5 November 1962, at Alvarez finca; delivery of sand and cement; Soviets increasing efforts of completion of construction (SAM support/assembly at Santiago de Cuba). (TDCS 3/528,150) 13 Nov 62.

14. Troop movements at Camilo Cienfuegos school city in Las Mercedes; Soviets and trucks observed at Yarabo finca heading direction of Palma Soriano; Cuban troop movements at Mayari, Santiago de Cuba, Dos Palmas, and Puerto de Moyo. (TDCS 3/528,103), 11 Nov 62.

15. Observations of cabotage at Santiago de Cuba citing Norwegian EVJE arrival 28 October 1962, and arrival of Soviet mership LENINISKIY KOMSOMOL on 1 November 1962, and departure on 2 November 1962. (TDCS 3/527,936), 9 Nov 62.

16. GOC making survey of shelter areas at El Cristo. (TDCS 3/527,759), 7 Nov 62.

17. Soviets increasing efforts to construct missile base along El Cobre-Santiago de Cuba road. (Area for the installation officially designated Santiago de Cuba SAM assembly/support site. (TDCS 3/527,597), 7 November 62.

18. Underground storage between San Pedro de Cacocum and Holguin for aircraft; Soviet nationals living at old Cupey Central. (This is the area of the Holguin Jet Base; underground storage is strict translation of Spanish-language reporting on revetted aircraft hangars). (TDCS 3/527,275) 3 Nov 62).

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19. Mobilization of Cuban ground forces and armored units at Mangos de Baruga; transfer of troops to Guantanamo. (TDCS-3/527,266; 3 November 1962).
20. Downing of American plane in Oriente Province. (TDCSDB-3/652,028; 2 November 1962).
21. Cuban Government orders return of weapons held by personnel not actively in service. (TDCS-3/527,202; 1 November 1962).
22. Dispersement of Cuban troops at Punta de Moquenque. (TDCS-3/526,674; 28 October 1962).
23. Cuban Militia at Punta de Moquenque; restrictions placed on private boats in Santiago de Cuba; Cuban Government assumed control of privately-owned vehicles. (TDCS-3/526,326; 25 October 1962).
24. Arrival of military equipment at Santiago de Cuba transferred towards Guantanamo (missile-related equipment subsequently related to Cabanas SAM site near Guantanamo). (TDCS-3/526,176; 24 October 1962).
25. Arrival of Soviet (missile and related) equipment at Santiago de Cuba. (TDCS-3/526,176; 24 October 1962).
26. Military traffic from Santiago de Cuba to Guantanamo (Cabanas SA-3 Site). (TDCS-3/525,965; 24 October 1962).
27. Soviet ships and (missile) equipment at Santiago de Cuba (supra). (TDCS-3/525,919; 23 October 1962).
28. Soviet merships identified upon arrival and equipment described while being transported enroute to Mayari Arriba from Santiago de Cuba. SA-2 carriers and cannisters have been observed at Mayari Arriba. (TDCSDB-3/651,808; 21 October 1962).
29. Two trailer trucks joined to transport one 1,000-mile rocket from Santiago de Cuba to Palma Soriano; (SA-2) missile site at Jiguani, Oriente Province. (TDCSDB-3/651,757; 17 October 1962).
30. On 8 October 1962, the possibility of storing missiles at the Pepus Cave was reported. On 17 October 1962, a cave entrance or underground bunker under construction was confirmed at the site indicated by AMTORRID as the Pepu Cave. (TDCSDB-3/651,757; 17 October 1962).
31. Soviet personnel and (missile) equipment transported from Santiago de Cuba to Mayari Arriba and Cabanas. (TDCS-3/524,448; 8 October 1962).

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32. Missiles at Mayari Arriba and Banes. Both Surface to Air and Cruise Surface to Surface Missile Sites have been confirmed at Banes. Missile carriers and missile cannisters have been confirmed at Mayari Arriba. (TDCS-3/524,263; 3 October 1962).

33. AMTORRID reported that on 23 October 1962 a convoy of 42 vehicles which included seven missile carriers was destined for Mayari Arriba. On 3 October 1962 continued construction of an underground installation near Mayari Arriba was reported. (TDCS-3/523,211; 3 October 1962).

34. On 20 September 1962 AMTORRID reported a Soviet tent camp of 250 Russians undertaking excavations as preliminary construction activities. On 2 October 1962 an AMTORRID asset reported this area had been designated as a restricted military zone. This installation was confirmed as the Cabanas SA-2 (SAM) site on 15 October 1962. (TDCS-3/523,873; 1 October 1962).

35. Soviet merships arriving in Santiago de Cuba are identified and the material offloaded is described, giving the routes taken by the convoys transporting the cargo. The routes provided by AMTORRID sources were primary leads in discovery of the Cabanas, Manzanillo, Jiguani, and Maldonado SAM Sites. (TDCS-3/523,873; 1 October 1962).

36. Military equipment in Oriente Province (this and subsequent reports on off-loading of vessels at Santiago de Cuba, led to confirmation of installations which later were transferred into the Cabanas SA-2 Site and the SA-2 Assembly/Support area at Mayari Arriba, and related to the Jiguani and Matanzas SA-2 sites). (CS-3/523,855; 1 October 1962).

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