

RELEASE IN FULL

SECRET

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3334

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USVIENNA 01627

NODIS **DECAPTIONED**

FOR THE SECRETARY

PASS ALSO TO SECDEF CHENEY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
SCOWCROFT, CJCS GEN. POWELL, ACDA DIRECTOR LEHMAN AND
JUDGE WEBSTER

FROM USDEL CFE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, NATO, PREL, KCFE
SUBJECT: CFE: VISITING FRG OFFICIAL ON THE GERMANS,
- THE SOVIETS AND CFE

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. VISITING FRG HLTF REP, AMB. ANTON
ROSSBACH (PROTECT FULLY), TOLD U.S. DEPREP KAPLAN JUNE
8 THAT KOHL AND GENSCHER WERE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE
GERMAN UNIFICATION, A CFE TREATY AND A CSCE SUMMIT
THIS YEAR, AND WERE PREPARED "TO PAY QUITE A HIGH
PRICE TO SECURE THESE GOALS." ROSSBACH SAID MOSCOW
WAS THREATENING TO HOLD UP THESE GERMAN AIMS IN THE
HOPE THAT GERMAN POLITICIANS WOULD LOSE THEIR NERVE IN
THE RUN UP TO THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS AND MAKE FURTHER
CONCESSIONS, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD "PRACTICALLY NO
SECRET**REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior
Reviewer**

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LEVERAGE" IN OBJECTIVE TERMS OVER THE GERMANS AND
AMERICANS. ROSSBACH DIDN'T KNOW HOW HIGH A PRICE
GERMAN LEADERS ULTIMATELY WOULD PAY FOR THE CFE TREATY
AND THE CSCE SUMMIT, OR WHETHER BONN OR MOSCOW WOULD
SHOW THE "COOLER NERVES." HE REFERRED TO GENSCHER'S
WISH TO PRESERVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE USSR,
WHILE PURSUING GERMAN SECURITY OBJECTIVES,
AND GENSCHER'S "FURY" IN LEARNING OF TELTSCHIK'S
REPORTED THREAT TO USE ECONOMIC LEVERAGE IN MOSCOW.
SEPTELS COVER GERMAN PERSONNEL LIMITS, AS WELL AS

AIRCRAFT AND CFE FOLLOW-ON. END SUMMARY.

3. U.S. DEPREP KAPLAN MET JUNE 8 AT THE HOFBURG WITH FRG AMBASSADOR ROSSBACH, WHO WAS VISITING FROM BONN. ROSSBACH IS THE GERMAN HLTf REP AND A FORMER SENIOR OFFICIAL IN THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE. THE CONVERSATION WAS HIGHLY CANDID AND ROSSBACH SHOULD BE FULLY PROTECTED.

4. KAPLAN BEGAN BY ASKING WHAT THE GERMANS WANT TO ACHIEVE THIS YEAR. ROSSBACH SAID: "(1) UNIFICATION; (2) A CFE TREATY; (3) A CSCE SUMMIT."

5. ROSSBACH ADDED THAT GENSCHER HAD AN ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVE: "TO PRESERVE A FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION." HE SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTER REGARDED THE USSR AS A "WOUNDED BEAR," WHICH HAD TO BE TREATED CAUTIOUSLY BECAUSE OF ITS "NUCLEAR CLAWS." ACCORDING TO ROSSBACH, GENSCHER DID NOT WANT TO ACHIEVE THE ABOVE GERMAN OBJECTIVES BY EXPLOITING CURRENT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES AND HUMILIATING GORBACHEV AND THE SOVIET GOVERNING CLASS. IN AN INTERESTING ASIDE, ROSSBACH SAID THAT GENSCHER CONSIDERED THAT FDR
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HAD HAD THE RIGHT IDEA AFTER WORLD WAR II BUT THAT, DUE TO HIS DEATH, HAD NOT HAD THE TIME TO CARRY IT OUT.

6. ACCORDING TO ROSSBACH, GENSCHER VIEWED KOHL AS HAVING A DIFFERENT APPROACH. HE SAID KOHL WAS FOCUSING ON THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS, EXCESSIVELY HE THOUGHT, GIVEN THE HUGE HISTORIC STAKES PRESENTLY INVOLVED, AND WAS PREPARED TO SECURE THE ABOVE GERMAN OBJECTIVES EVEN IF THAT MEANT THE OPEN USE OF GERMAN LEVERAGE AGAINST A "VULNERABLE USSR." ROSSBACH SAID HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY HOW HORST TELTSCHIK HAD PLAYED HIS HAND DURING HIS "SECRET" TRIP TO MOSCOW. BUT THE WORD AROUND BONN WAS THAT TELTSCHIK HAD LINKED GERMAN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR THE USSR TO SOVIET SUPPORT FOR GERMAN SECURITY OBJECTIVES, A KIND OF "REVERSE LINKAGE." ROSSBACH CHARACTERIZED GENSCHER AS HAVING BEEN "FURIOUS" UPON LEARNING OF THE TELTSCHIK MISSION, ABOUT WHICH HE ALLEGEDLY HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED.

7. KAPLAN ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS A FOURTH GERMAN OBJECTIVE, IN ADDITION TO THE THREE MENTIONED ABOVE -- NAMELY, FULL GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. ROSSBACH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE DEBATE AND HEAVY SOVIET PRESSURE IN BONN. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT GENSCHER WAS SAYING CLEARLY THAT THE FRG SHOULD REMAIN A FULL NATO MEMBER. KAPLAN ASKED WHETHER THE "FRG" FORMULATION ALSO COVERED A UNITED

GERMANY. ROSSBACH GRINNED AND SAID: "YES, I BELIEVE SO."

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8. TURNING TO CFE, KAPLAN ASKED WHAT PRICE THE
GERMANS THOUGHT WE NEEDED TO PAY IN ORDER TO SECURE A
CFE TREATY, AND THEREFORE A CSCE SUMMIT, THIS YEAR.
ROSSBACH REPLIED THAT, FOR THE REASONS MENTIONED
ABOVE, "I THINK GERMANY WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO QUITE
FAR."

9. KAPLAN THEN ASKED HOW ROSSBACH SAW THE SITUATION IN TERMS OF GERMAN AND SOVIET LEVERAGE IN THE VARIOUS SECURITY FORA DEALING WITH GERMAN RELATED ISSUES. ROSSBACH SAID THERE WAS A DICHOTOMY. ON THE ONE HAND, IN OBJECTIVE TERMS, THE SOVIETS HAD NO LEVERAGE AT ALL. UNIFICATION WOULD OCCUR THIS YEAR AND BERLIN
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THEN WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AS THE POLITICAL CAPITAL OF GERMANY, WITH BONN REMAINING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPITAL FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME. THE RUSSIANS COULD THREATEN TO HOLD UP UNIFICATION IN TWO-PLUS-FOUR. BUT THE THREAT WAS NOT CREDIBLE GIVEN THE COMBINATION OF SOVIET ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY, THE SOVIET NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY (IN ORDER TO AVOID BECOMING THE "NEW SICK MAN OF EUROPE") AND THE RISK OF SOME INCIDENT IN EAST GERMANY THAT COULD MAKE THE SOVIET MILITARY POSITION UNTENABLE.

10. THAT SAID, CONTINUED ROSSBACH, LEVERAGE WAS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER. THE SOVIETS, HE CLAIMED, WERE DOING WHAT THEY HAD DONE SO OFTEN IN THE POST-WAR ERA. IT REMINDED HIM OF THE CHILD WHO "THREATENED TO HOLD HIS BREATH UNTIL HE DIED." THE CHILD, AS EVERY PARENT KNEW, WOULD DESIST WELL BEFORE HIS LIFE WAS AT RISK. AS EVERY PSYCHOLOGIST ALSO KNEW, HOWEVER, MANY MOTHERS WOULD GIVE IN LONG BEFORE THEIR CHILDREN RELEASED THEIR BREATH.

11. THIS ANALOGY, AS ROSSBACH SAW IT, ILLUMINATED THE CURRENT SOVIET-GERMAN GAME. WHEN ASKED HOW THE GERMANS WOULD RESPOND, ROSSBACH SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW THE BOTTOM LINE, AS THAT GAME WAS BEING PLAYED IN GERMANY BETWEEN GENSCHER AND KOHL, WITH THE LARGE ELECTORAL STAKES PROBABLY TRANSCENDING STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS.

12. ROSSBACH CLOSED BY RETURNING TO HIS EARLIER REFERENCE TO GENSCHER'S DESIRE TO PRESERVE FRIENDLY TIES WITH THE SOVIETS WHILE SETTling KEY GERMAN QUESTIONS. HE UNDERSTOOD THIS POSITION BUT CONFESSED
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TO BEING WORRIED ABOUT IT. IN HIS JUDGMENT, GENSCHER'S WISH TO AVOID "MESSINESS" WITH THE SOVIETS AFFORDED MOSCOW ITS ONLY REAL POINT OF LEVERAGE IN THE CURRENT TACTICAL GAME. HE WAS NOT SURE HOW THIS WOULD

PLAY OUT. BUT HE WAS CONCERNED. WOOLSEY

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