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AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ALLIES ON WASHINGTON SUMMIT

REF: ✓ STATE 178619

- SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.
- POSTS MAY DRAW ON POINTS IN PARA 3 FOR PROVIDING ALLIES GREATER DETAIL ON WASHINGTON SUMMIT MEETING. ARMS SECRET SECRET

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CONTROL BRIEFING POINTS ARE BEING SENT SEPTEL. POSTS

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SHOULD NOTE THAT THESE POINTS SUPPLEMENT THE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES SENT REFTEL AND VIA WHITE HOUSE CHANNELS.

3. BEGIN TEXT BRIEFING POINTS:

OVERVIEW

O WHEN PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV MET LAST DECEMBER IN MALTA, THEY LAID OUT A BROAD AGENDA TO GUIDE THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

O MUCH OF THAT AGENDA HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETED; THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT AND CONCRETE AGREEMENTS SPANNING THE RANGE OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES.

O IN TOTAL, THE SIDES CONCLUDED 14 AGREEMENTS AND RELEASED 11 JOINT STATEMENTS. THESE REFLECT A MATURING OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AS WE PRESS FORWARD WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S GOAL OF CHALLENGING OUR PAST HISTORY OF CONFRONTATION AND BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP OF ENDURING COOPERATION.

O BUT SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN US ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. FIRST OF ALL WAS THE QUESTION OF THE BALTICS.

-- GORBACHEV EXPLAINED HIS POSITION AND THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MOSCOW WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH VILNIUS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT INSIST THAT THE LITHUANIANS ANNUL
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THEIR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ONLY THAT THEY SUSPEND IT AND PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET LAW.

-- THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED OUR NON-RECOGNITION POLICY AND SUPPORT FOR THE BALTIC PEOPLES' STRIVINGS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- WE LEFT THE SOVIETS WITH NO DOUBTS AS TO OUR CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF DIALOGUE AND MOSCOW'S

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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, AND OF THEIR EFFECT ON
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

O THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE SUMMIT WERE GOOD. THE
PRESIDENTS APPROACHED PROBLEMS IN A CORDIAL AND
CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. EVEN ON ISSUES WHERE THEY
DISAGREED.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT NOTED, IT WAS A MARK OF HOW FAR
THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS COME THAT HIS
DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV ON DIFFICULT ISSUES
COULD BE CHARACTERIZED BY A SPIRIT OF CANDOR AND
OPENNESS, WITH THE SIDES SEEKING NOT ONLY TO
UNDERSTAND THE OTHER'S POSITION, BUT TO BUILD
COOPERATION.

-- INDEED, GORBACHEV AT ONE POINT OBSERVED THAT, HAD
U.S.-SOVIET WORKING RELATIONS NOT BEEN SO WELL
DEVELOPED LAST YEAR, THE RAPID PACE OF CHANGE IN

EUROPE COULD HAVE PROVOKED A REAL CLASH OF
INTERESTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, LIKE
"PUTTING A MATCH TO A BONFIRE."

O SO WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A GOOD BASIS FOR TACKLING
THOSE UNRESOLVED ISSUES THAT REMAIN ON OUR AGENDA.

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O THE LEADERS AGREED TO MEET ON A REGULAR BASIS WITH A
FOCUS ON WORKING ENCOUNTERS. GORBACHEV INVITED THE
PRESIDENT TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

GERMANY AND EUROPE

O PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV HAD AN IN-DEPTH
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN EUROPE,
WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE PROCESS OF GERMAN
UNIFICATION.

O WHILE NO BREAKTHROUGHS WERE MADE, SOME NEW IDEAS
EMERGED THAT WILL BE EXPLORED IN UPCOMING

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DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND IN THE
TWO-PLUS-FOUR.

O THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT
ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP WAS A MATTER FOR THE GERMANS TO
DECIDE, CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
GORBACHEV DID NOT OBJECT.

O BUT SOVIET THINKING SEEMS STILL TO BE IN FLUX AND
CHARACTERIZED BY MANY INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS.

O GORBACHEV REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF A
TRANSITION PERIOD.

O IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF CHOICE MEANS IN PRACTICE.

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O PRESIDENT BUSH REITERATED OUR APPROACH TO GERMAN
UNIFICATION, STRESSING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO
DISCRIMINATORY CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AND
NO SINGULARIZATION OF A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC GERMANY.

O HE ASSURED GORBACHEV THAT NO ONE WANTED TO ISOLATE
THE SOVIETS.

O HE REVIEWED THE NINE POINTS WE HAVE DEVELOPED TO
ADDRESS THE SOVIETS' LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS,
AND STRESSED THAT GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS A
FACTOR FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

O HE ALSO NOTED THE BENEFITS TO THE USSR OF ECONOMIC
RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GERMANY.

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED REGIONAL ISSUES DURING
THE THIRD DAY OF THE SUMMIT AT CAMP DAVID.

O THE DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD IN AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WAS
VERY RELAXED, FREE-WHEELING AND MARKED BY

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EXTRAORDINARY CANDOR AND OPENNESS.

O MANY IDEAS WERE EXCHANGED AND A BROADER BASIS FOR COOPERATION WAS ESTABLISHED ON SOME ISSUES. ALTHOUGH NO BREAKTHROUGHS OCCURRED.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED AFGHANISTAN AND AGREED THAT THERE WAS A MEASURE OF COMMON GROUND IN THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES.

-- IN PARTICULAR, WE AGREE ON USING THE ELECTORAL
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PROCESS AS A MECHANISM FOR ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT. WE ALSO AGREE THAT A TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY SHOULD PREPARE FOR AND CONDUCT ELECTIONS.

O THE CRITICAL AREA OF DIFFERENCE REMAINS THE ROLE OF NAJIBULLAH IN A TRANSITION PERIOD.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT NAJIBULLAH RETAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF INCUMBENCY DURING A TRANSITION PROCESS -- A POSITION THAT MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT TO GET SUCH A PROCESS STARTED. PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF RESISTANCE VIEWS ABOUT NAJIBULLAH.

O ON THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE RECENT ATTEMPTED PALESTINIAN TERRORIST RAID AGAINST ISRAEL, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT YASSIR ARAFAT HAD TO CONDEMN THAT ACT, AND DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM ITS SPONSORS.

O THE SOVIETS AGREED ARAFAT SHOULD CONDEMN THAT INCIDENT.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAD A CANDID EXCHANGE ON THE EMIGRATION ISSUE AND THE QUESTION OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRANTS SETTLING IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH PUSHED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AEROFLOT-EL AL DIRECT FLIGHTS AGREEMENT TO ASSIST THE PROCESS OF EMIGRATION AND TO ALLEVIATE

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HARDSHIPS POSED BY THE LACK OF DIRECT AIR LINKS
BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.
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O PRESIDENT GORBACHEV COMPLAINED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF
ISRAEL ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
AND URGED THE U.S. TO DO MORE IN THAT REGARD.

-- GORBACHEV NOTED THAT THE USSR HAD BEEN BOMBARDED
WITH CRITICISM FROM ARAB COUNTRIES ON THE ISSUE
OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION AND IMPLIED DURING
HIS JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT BUSH
THAT, IF SOVIET CONCERNS ARE NOT HEEDDED BY
ISRAEL, HE MAY HAVE TO GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO
ISSUING EXIT PERMITS.

-- HE STATED HIS HOPE THAT ISRAEL WOULD PROVIDE
ASSURANCES AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
U.S. ON THE ISSUE OF NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

O THE SOVIETS SAID NOTHING DURING THE PRIVATE SUMMIT
DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, TO INDICATE ANY BACKSLIDING
FROM THEIR COMMITMENT TO PERMIT OPEN SOVIET JEWISH
EMIGRATION. FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAS SUBSE-
QUENTLY CONFIRMED TO SECRETARY BAKER THAT SOVIET
EMIGRATION POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE.

O THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED THE VOLATILE SITUATION
IN KASHMIR AGREEING TO WATCH THE SITUATION CAREFULLY
AND TO URGE RESTRAINT IN CONTINUING PARALLEL
APPROACHES TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

O THE TWO LEADERS REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA AND CUBA. SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ALSO DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT.

O BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE
ESQUIPULAS PEACE PROCESS.
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O THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY URGED THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH CASTRO TO GET CUBA TO END ARMS SHIFMENTS TO THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR AND SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE SALVADORAN CONFLICT.

-- WHILE SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. MAKE DIRECT APPROACHES TO CUBA IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, THE SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD PROBE THE CUBANS ON THE ISSUE OF ARMS TO THE FMLN, AND WOULD ALSO CONTINUE ECONOMIC AID TO NICARAGUA.

O ON ASIA, PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, POINTING OUT THAT THE U.S. FULLY SUPPORTS THE JAPANESE CLAIM TO THOSE ISLANDS.

-- HE URGED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE WITH JAPAN, SINCE THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO A REDUCTION OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE OFFERED ITS STANDARD REPLY ON THE ISSUE, THAT IT IS A BILATERAL PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED BETWEEN THE USSR AND JAPAN. GORBACHEV ALSO REFERRED TO HIS PLANNED TRIP TO JAPAN IN 1991.

O THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED CAMBODIA. THE PRESIDENT FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF JAPAN, THAILAND AND OTHER STATES TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES.

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-- THEY ALSO TOOK NOTE OF THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR IN THE PERM FIVE MEETINGS ON THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO DISCUSSED THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

-- IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS UPCOMING MEETING WITH ROK

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PRESIDENT ROH TAE WOO IN SAN FRANCISCO ON JUNE 4. GORBACHEV EXPLAINED THAT THE USSR INTENDED TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNDERScoreD THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL TO BE GAINED FOR MOSCOW FROM BETTER TIES WITH SEOUL.

-- HE ADMITTED THAT IT WOULD COMPLICATE SOVIET RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA, BUT SAID THAT MOSCOW WOULD GO AHEAD WITH ITS PLANS NEVERTHELESS.

O PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM, EXPRESSING U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE DPRK TO SIGN AND IMPLEMENT AN IAEA NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

-- THE U.S. NOTED THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE NORTH HAD BEEN GIVEN STANDARD NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S.

O GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT THE USSR WAS CONCERNED AS WELL ABOUT NORTH KOREAN FAILURE TO ACT ON ITS OBLIGATIONS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD APPROACHED THE NORTH ON THIS ISSUE AND SUGGESTED THE U.S. CONSIDER A DIRECT APPROACH TO FYONGYANG.

O ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WERE NOT BROUGHT UP BY EITHER SIDE.

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O THE PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN AFRICA. FOCUSING ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE PROBLEMS IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA.

-- THE TWO LEADERS OFFERED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR AN INTRA-ANGOLAN DIALOGUE AND THE CURRENT PROCESS UNDERWAY BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ON SOUTH AFRICA, BOTH EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT, SINCE PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND NELSON MANDELA WERE ENGAGED IN TALKS.

O AS A SYMBOL OF OUR GROWING ABILITY TO COOPERATE IN

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THE RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THE TWO
PRESIDENTS ALSO ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT ON ETHIOPIA.

-- THE STATEMENT CALLS FOR A UN-LED RELIEF EFFORT
THAT WOULD USE SOVIET TRANSPORT TO CARRY AMERICAN
FOOD TO THOSE IN NEED IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA. THE
STATEMENT ALSO EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE PEACE
EFFORTS WOULD SUCCEED.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

O U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS ADVANCED CONSIDERABLY
AT THE SUMMIT.

O THE KEY ITEM WAS THE SIGNING OF THE COMMERCIAL
AGREEMENT WHICH -- WHEN IT GOES INTO FORCE -- WILL
PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR
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COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. THAT AGREEMENT BREAKS MUCH
NEW GROUND IN DEFINING U.S. COMMERCIAL RELATIONS
WITH THE USSR, PROVIDING:

- SUBSTANTIAL GUARANTEES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY;
- BUSINESS FACILITATION; AND
- GUARANTEES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS.

O THE SIGNING OF THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT IS ONE STEP
TOWARD THE EXTENSION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS
(MFN); BUT TWO MORE STEPS ARE REQUIRED:

- CONGRESS MUST APPROVE THE AGREEMENT; AND
- THE PRESIDENT MUST WAIVE THE JACKSON-VANIK
AMENDMENT.

O PRESIDENT BUSH MADE CLEAR THAT HE WILL NEITHER WAIVE
JACKSON-VANIK NOR SUBMIT THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT TO
CONGRESS FOR APPROVAL UNTIL THE SUPREME SOVIET

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PASSES THE LONG-PROMISED EMIGRATION LEGISLATION.

-- WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THIS.

O SEVERAL OTHER AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED AT THE SUMMIT WHICH SHOULD PROMOTE COOPERATION IN KEY ECONOMIC AREAS. THESE INCLUDE:

-- AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT THAT WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE AIR LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES;

-- A LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT SETTING HIGHER

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BENCHMARKS FOR U.S. GRAIN SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION; AND

-- A MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT THAT NORMALIZES MARITIME AND SHIPPING RELATIONS.

O THE SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE BERING SEA FISHERIES TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN ABOUT UNREGULATED FISHING WHICH HAS SEVERELY DISRUPTED FISH STOCKS IN THE CENTRAL BERING SEA "DONUT," THE AREA BEYOND U.S. AND SOVIET 200-MILE ZONES.

-- THE STATEMENT SHOULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AN EFFORT TO MOUNT MULTILATERAL MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION SCHEME FOR THE CENTRAL BERING SEA.

O THE PRESIDENTS HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON PERESTROYKA AND ON THE PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION THAT PRESIDENT BUSH ADVANCED AT THE MALTA SUMMIT.

-- THE SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT WHICH UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS AN EXPRESSION OF U.S. AND SOVIET COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER IN SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC PERESTROYKA.

HUMAN RIGHTS

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O THE PRESIDENT PRESSED GORBACHEV FOR ACTION ON THOSE UNRESOLVED REFUSENIK CASES ON THE LISTS PRESENTED AT MALTA, NOTING OUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THESE HAD NOT

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BEEN "ZERDED OUT" AND ASKING FOR THE SOVIET PRESIDENT TO LOOK INTO THESE PERSONALLY.

O THE PRESIDENT ALSO NOTED OUR CONCERN ABOUT INDICATIONS OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE USSR AND URGED GORBACHEV TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY AND FORCEFULLY AGAINST IT.

END TEXT POINTS.

4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER

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