TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

45

COMMUNICATIONS.
COMMAND. CONTROL.
AND INTELLIGENCE

(D#1)

1 4 JUN 1980

AEHORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Faise Missile Alerts (U) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U) This memorandum is the third periodic report on the actions being taken to correct the false missile warning problem which occurred on


Operational/Procedural Actions (U)

Implemented as a result of the ncidents were clarified by a message on June 12 from the Director, Operations, OJCS, to his counterparts at CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC and CINCNORAD, and to the NEACP. The same procedures were the subject of a June 13 conference call initiated by LtGen Shutler, Director, Operations, DJCS to the Command Directors at LANTCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, SAC, ADCOM and ANMCC with NEACP represented in the NMCC where the conference was convened. I was invited to be present in the NMCC during this conference. The purpose of the conference call was to insure understanding of the procedures to be followed by all commands in the event of (b)

Technical/Equipment Actions (U)

(U) On June 11 and 12 Dr. Van Trees and the Task Force headed by Bob Evans met at NORAD and conducted a thorough review of the NORAD computer system and the recent false alert incidents. Bob Evans is writing a report which he will circulate to other Task Force members for approval and provide to me shortly. In addition, he provided some preliminary comments. The principal points are:

Classified by ASD (C31)
Review so 14 June 2000
Extended by ASD (C31)
Reasons: 5 and 6



TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

The Task Force agrees there is high probability that the suspect integrated circuit is the source of the probability problems. They can find no other reasonable failure mechanism; however, with present data, they cannot be absolutely certain the suspect integrated circuit—is the failure mechanism. After studying the probable failure, the Task Force will recommend specific short-term (30-100 day) actions which, after detailed analysis, should permit use of the state of the suspect in the suspect integrated circuit.

TO The Task	Force has also	found that t	he basic		They
		(0)(1)			
will make add	itional recommen	dations to i	mprove the	(0)(1)
	h the fixes NORA	o alase and	those the Te	sk Force will	recommend
they feel it	n the Tixes Nurv	() piens and	Those the in		using
they real it	15 11 +h	us continuis	a to require	careful pro	cedures and
human oversig		,			•
11000011 010,018		<i>:</i>	,		

- (U) The Task Force will meet again in Washington, D.C. on 23 and 24 June.
- (U) In parallel with the Task Force activities I am implementing several actions:

NORAD should put a bound put a to detect and notify the operator whenever could be tested and implemented in the system in 3 to 4 weeks.

on an accelerated basis, methods should be analyzed for improving the used in the NORAD-to-user communications system.

I have organized a small team of experts in this area working under a member of my staff. They will begin work at NORAD on Monday, June 16. My early estimate is that it will take 2 to 3 months to implement improved techniques.

be necessary to modify some of the will require coordination with the users and, perhaps, some modification of their equipment.

My tentative recommendation is to leave the system on the until we have proceeded through at least steps 1 and 2. Before making this decision the JCS should make a detailed assessment of any operational disadvantages that are incurred by using the limit 1 have asked the JCS to provide this assessment by June 18. I should point out that the

(b#1)

Gerald P. Digneen

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, 635, OJCS SUBJECT:

() It appears that it may be advisable to cont	inue operation on the
for a period of 3-6 weeks until improvement in	the (b)(t)
	in be instituted. I would
like to have an assessment of the operational impact	of operating on the
	d like a detailed break-
down of the functions that can be performed	and the resulting
displays and a list of the	
that are normally provided in the that	it will not be available.
using the Based on this, I would like a summa	ry of how this
affects CINCNORAD's capability to accompli	sh his mission. I would
appreciate receiving this assessment by June 184.	

Corald P. Dinneer



This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu