OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

18 October 1978

Memo For Mr. Duncan

DEP SEC. HAS SEEN

Charles:

Attached is a paper prepared by Walt Slocombe in response to your request of yesterday. I agree with it fully.


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Authority: EO 13526 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: JAN 0 3 2017

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 3 Jan 2017 Authority: EO 13526
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Launch on Warning

One sometimes hears the argument that ere of our options for responding to the threat to be a six adopting a grant or

strategy. Because I believe that is not an option, I am addressing it separately here.

It is useful to remind the that if they were to contemplate an they could not count on when the attack arrived. I -- and others in the Administration -- have given such reminders.

At the same time, I believe it would be dangerous, wrong, and ineffective for us to plan to constant the same time, I believe it would be dangerous, wrong, and ineffective for us to plan to constant the same time, I believe it would be dangerous, wrong, and ineffective for us to plan to constant the same time, I believe it would be dangerous, wrong, and ineffective for us to plan to constant the same time, I believe it would be dangerous, wrong, and ineffective for us to plan to constant the same time, I believe it would be dangerous, wrong, and ineffective for us to plan to constant the same time, I believe it would be dangerous, wrong, and ineffective for us to plan to constant the same time, I believe it would be dangerous, wrong, and ineffective for us to plan to constant the same time.

-- By definition, a _________ No matter how much we'proved' technically that any _______ was foolproof, the people would, rightly distrust a policy which required that the

-- It is a principle of our planning, especially in this Administration, will be able to make the real decisions in a

-- Finally a has serious because it depends on the The temptation for the

policy that forced

We would not want a

In short, it is useful to remind the of the possibility and to do certain things to make it feasible, but reliance on as a substitute for a su

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