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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Action: Policy Plans
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18 DEC 1978

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

13 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PROGRAM ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ✓
DIRECTOR, OSD/NET ASSESSMENT
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ISA
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (ATOMIC ENERGY)

SUBJECT: Nuclear Targeting Policy Review

Secretary Brown has reviewed the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review and would like to begin implementation of some of the study recommendations immediately. Other actions will have to await NSC consideration of the report.

The attached memoranda have been designed to carry out those actions that can begin now. I would like any comments that you may have on the attached package by COB 20 December 1978.

LA
Leon Sloss
Director,
Nuclear Targeting Policy Review

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 2011-002, Document 1 Date OCT. 24, 2013

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Chief, Declassification Division, WDS

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GENERAL GUIDANCE: The Nuclear Targeting Policy Review has emphasized the importance of implementing a nuclear strategy and developing supporting capabilities that will deter the Soviet Union from using their military power not only by threatening damage to the Soviet Union but also by making Soviet military victory, as seen through Soviet eyes, as improbable as we can make it, independent of Soviet employment policy and any particular scenario. This is a major theme that should guide the implementation of the study. Our objective is not to create war fighting capabilities, but to strengthen deterrence. To the extent that we can deny any adversary the prospect of using nuclear weapons to his advantage, deterrence is strengthened. The capabilities that are required for this objective are also essential in the event that nuclear deterrence fails.

Among the most important characteristics that we should build into our strategic plans and capabilities are flexibility and endurance. These characteristics are defined in general terms in the Targeting Study. A precise definition of requirements for flexibility and endurance will be achieved only by developing specific plans and programs, and subjecting these plans and programs to review and discussion followed by subsequent decisions and action. This should be a major focus of the follow-on effort. I want to start this process at once and move forward as rapidly as possible. Under the overall direction of the Undersecretary for Policy, primary responsibility for developing more flexible plans will rest with the JCS; primary responsibility for developing specific programs to enhance endurance will rest with USDR&E. These efforts must be closely coordinated.

~~To this end, I am asking the Undersecretary for Policy, in coordination with the Chairman, JCS, the Undersecretary for R&ES, and in consultation with~~

with the Assistant Secretary of P&E, and the Assistant Secretary, ISA
to develop a long-range plan for phasing in changes in both operational plans
and capabilities for the implementation of a revised employment policy along
the lines recommended in the Targeting Study. The purpose of this plan is to
assure that operational planning for nuclear forces on the one hand and devel-
opment and procurement planning on the other move ahead in parallel and that both
are consistent with our overall strategic policy. I intend to use this
plan as a management tool to monitor the implementation of changes in
employment policy. The plan should identify major milestones at which
desired adjustments in operational plans (including revised plans for the
SRF) and improved capabilities to support these plans can be meshed.
Every effort should be made to take advantage of low cost, short lead-
time improvements in strategic C³I endurance so that we can move as rapidly
as possible to incorporate greater endurance into strategic planning.
I would like to receive this long range plan no later than March 31, 1979.

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MEMORANDUM FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Study - Memorandum #1

PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to assign specific tasks for the implementation of the recently completed Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. This memorandum deals with tasks for which the USD(P) will have primary responsibility. Other memoranda will be addressed to other offices with responsibility for action on different aspects of the study. You will receive copies of these related memoranda for information.

I want to move as promptly as possible to implement those recommendations of the Targeting Study that are within the purview of the Department of Defense. While many of the recommendations can be carried out within the framework of current policy, major policy issues will have to be resolved in the NSC framework. In this memorandum and the accompanying ones to other DoD offices, the major tasks to be undertaken within DoD, assignments of responsibilities and establishment of a specific schedule of actions are described.

RESPONSIBILITIES: Effective implementation will require close coordination between policy levels in OSD, OJCS and those responsible for development and procurement programs necessary to support our employment policy. It is important that we pursue a coherent and coordinated policy with respect to development of revised plans, new capabilities and public statements. I am asking you to assume overall responsibility for coordinating the follow-on work, not only for the nuclear targeting study but also the closely related PD-18 Study of the C³I support requirements for the Secure Reserve Force. The follow-on effort for these two studies should be closely integrated.

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Study - Memorandum #2

PURPOSE: (Same as Memo #1)

RESPONSIBILITIES: (Same as Memo #1)

GENERAL GUIDANCE: (Same as Memo #1)

BUILDING BLOCKS: The Targeting Study describes a building block approach to targeting in general terms (see pages ___ to ___ and Annex E). The concept involves developing packages of targets whose destruction would accomplish a specific military, political or economic objectives, and being able to combine these packages in different ways to accomplish multiple objectives. The JCS (working with JSTPS) should flesh out this concept, consulting as necessary with the Undersecretary for Policy and his staff for clarification of guidance. Annex E of the Targeting Study should be used as a point of departure for the development of building blocks, but the structure outlined in Annex E is intended to be illustrative rather than prescriptive. The objective of the approach is to provide the President with a broader (but still manageable) range of options if he should ever have to consider execution of the SIOP. I want JCS recommendations as to the best way of implementing the building block concept, taking into account operational problems involved in developing and coordinating the SIOP. While the goal of the building block approach is greater flexibility, we cannot compromise our ability to execute the full SIOP, if necessary. The first phase of this effort should be based on the existing TDI. As

4-
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new data is developed, building blocks may be refined and modified. I hope that we can make some initial changes in plans to incorporate greater flexibility during 1979, and be in a position to make substantial changes, if this seems warranted, in 1980. To this end, I would like a preliminary report, with recommendations, from the JCS in six months. This report should be coordinated with the Undersecretary for Policy prior to submission to me.

TARGET DATA: The modifications in targeting recommended by the Targeting Study will necessarily require changes to the target data base. I recognize that the design and maintenance of a responsive data base will be a complex but crucial task. Using the study's recommendations as a point of departure, I want the JCS to provide a plan for revising the data base. Priorities to be accorded the several elements of this task are as listed on pages 60-61 of the Targeting Study. At a minimum we should, within the next year drawing on the latest TDI: (a) expand the data base on the [redacted]

[redacted] to include their identified alternate locations, (b) revise priorities for [redacted] on the assumption they have warning as discussed in the study, and (c) develop an initial limited set of [redacted]

[redacted] would have a prompt effect on the war effort and estimate collateral damage as a result of attacking this set of targets. The plan should provide milestones, resource requirements, and data development costs. At least two alternative data development estimates should be provided. One will assume current production priorities, capability and priorities for this requirement. The second will assume increased priority and resources. Your estimates should

25X5, E.O.13526

25X5, E.O.13526

- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

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include information on the availability of raw data, collection efforts to be initiated for data base improvements, analysis problems related to this task, and identify any supporting reserach requirements. An initial plan should be coordinated with the Undersecretary for Policy and then submitted to me by 31 March 1979. Work on the plan should not inhibit the initiation of those improvements which can be readily and easily accommodated.

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MODIFICATIONS TO CHINA TARGETING

The Nuclear Targeting Policy Review recommends that our employment policy with respect to China be modified to reflect current political and military realities. While major changes in policy will require Presidential approval, I would like you to initiate steps that will permit us to adjust our targeting plans with the overall aim of handling China targeting through non-SIOP options and the Secure Reserve Force should the President confirm this approach.

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These tasks should be addressed now and a preliminary report with recommendations should be submitted to me by 1 June 1979. This report should be coordinated with the Undersecretary of Policy prior to submission to me. Planning for these recommendations should proceed so that implementation can be initiated in as timely a manner as possible depending on the outcome of NSC deliberations.

~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK (LUA)

An LUA option for ICBMs only should be developed, but, as noted in the targeting study, LUA cannot be a substitute for measures to reduce ICBM vulnerability; rather it is an interim measure designed to strengthen deterrence.

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The designated targets

for this option should include at a minimum those facilities noted in the recommendations of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. The attack should be designed to minimize fatalities while still achieving the objectives of the attack. Several options should be developed which demonstrate the trade-off between damage expectancies and fatalities in attacks on target sets of various sizes and types.

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~~The LUA option should be ready for implementation during the 1981-1982~~ period. It should not be incorporated in plans, however, until it adequately reflects the building blocks that are developed to support SIOP planning. The recommended LUA option(s) should be coordinated with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prior to submission to me.

TOP SECRET

THE SECURE RESERVE FORCE

The role, objectives, and characteristics of the Secure Reserve Force have now been examined and it is time to initiate actions to improve our capabilities to support the concept. This will require programmatic actions to improve the endurance of these forces as well as the supporting C³I so that at any stage in a prolonged nuclear war our [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 25X5, E.O.13526 [REDACTED]

To this end, the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering is currently developing a long-term acquisition program for strategic forces and related C³I with appropriate milestones to be implemented over time and incorporated into the FYDP. This program will be essential to the successful upgrading of our Secure Reserve component over the long run. In the meantime, however, even with existing C³I and retargeting capability, we can still take measures to strengthen the concept by devoting more of the least vulnerable portion of the TRIAD to the SRF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 25X5, E.O.13526 [REDACTED]

These short-term adjustments to our plans should be undertaken in two phases. In the first phase -- which should take no longer than nine months to complete -- alternative target sets should be developed for pre-selected options taking into account targets of likely continuing high value. In the second phase -- which should be completed within 15 months -- adjustments to the composition of the SRF should be undertaken which reflect emphasis

- 10 -

TOP SECRET

WORKING PAPERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

on maintenance of the most survivable forces in the SRF. The implementation of this latter change must be related to the more basic modifications to targeting policy (e.g., the development of building blocks) which are being pursued concomitantly.

It is essential that this effort and the follow-on work of the SRF study be closely coordinated with the C³I improvement programs being conducted by the Undersecretaries for Policy and Research & Engineering.

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NON-SIOP OPTIONS, ESCALATION CONTROL AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The Targeting Study recommends that we continue a policy of escalation control to include non-SIOP options, and suggests the need to develop non-military plans to complement limited and regional nuclear options and to integrate more closely the political and military aspects of an escalation control strategy. I agree with these recommendations,

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Taking into account the general guidance above, I would like the JCS to develop a plan for improving our escalation control strategy along the lines suggested in the Targeting Study (see especially pp. 29-34 and 48-50). This plan should include a schedule of exercises and political-military simulations designed both to improve our understanding of non-SIOP options and to familiarize senior officials both in DoD and other key agencies with current plans and capabilities. To the extent this plan requires cooperation with and/or participation of other government agencies, the JCS should consult with the Assistant Secretary, ISA.

- 12 -
~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

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One means for accomplishing the above objectives is to increase the frequency and variety of political-military simulations and CPXs specifically dedicated to considering the issues associated with various options. Such exercises could be used to familiarize interagency decision-makers with the requirements of politically and militarily useful options. Such a process would provide an opportunity to develop and evaluate escalation control concepts in simulated crisis environments.

As a starting point, various techniques should be used (e.g., political-military simulations, crisis decision seminars, CPXs) to look at the following areas of concern:

- decision-making issues and considerations associated with employment of non-SIOP options
- development, modification, and refinement of non-SIOP options in a particular situation.
- CINC nuclear contingency planning capabilities, especially ad hoc planning and plan modification procedures..

The Joint Staff should evaluate the utility of this approach in conjunction with interested OSD offices, making recommendations regarding such matters as the desired frequency and scale of such exercises, and the extent to which interagency participation is useful. This discussion of issues and requirements for considering a methodology for development of non-SIOP options is intended to preclude other additional requirements that might be incorporated. A plan to carry out the program, including recommendations, should be developed and submitted to me by 1 April 1979. This report should be coordinated with the Undersecretary for Policy.

13- TOP SECRET WORKING PAPERS

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Study - Memorandum #3

PURPOSE: (Same as memo #1)

RESPONSIBILITIES: (Same as memo #1)

GENERAL GUIDANCE: (Same as memo #1)

ENDURANCE MEASURES: As an input to the plan mentioned above, DDR&E should develop a plan for enhancing the endurance of strategic forces and supporting C3I. This plan should include the time-phasing for introduction of new or revised capabilities and the estimated annual cost over a ten year period. The basic plan should be consistent with the FYDP. However, where DDR&E concludes after consultation with the Undersecretary for Policy and the Chairman, JCS that the FYDP constitutes a constraint on the achievement of sufficient flexibility and endurance to implement operational plans and where technologies exist to improve capabilities, the plan may recommend deviations in the FYDP. I want a particular effort made to identify low cost, short lead-time measures that will permit us to improve force endurance as much as possible in the next two years, and permit development of modifications in target planning consistent with such improvements.

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPERS

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MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Study - Memorandum #4

PURPOSE: (Same as memo #1)

RESPONSIBILITIES: (Same as memo #1)

GENERAL GUIDANCE: (Same as memo #1)

STUDY PROGRAM: The targeting study identified a number of areas where further study and analysis is required. The attachment lists priority areas for further study. I want you, in close consultation with the Director of DNA, the Director of ARPA, the Assistant Secretary (ISA) and the military services, to review this program and develop a funding plan to carry out these studies and such others as you may identify on a priority basis. Once a program with appropriate funding is developed, you should proceed to implement. I would like to have your completed study program forwarded to me no later than 28 February 1979.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, ISA

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Study - Memorandum #5

PURPOSE: (Same as memo #1)

RESPONSIBILITIES: (Same as memo #1)

GENERAL GUIDANCE: (Same as memo #1)

DEVELOPMENT OF NON-SIOP OPTIONS: The Targeting Study notes the need to develop political and other non-military measures that could be employed in conjunction with non-SIOP options. I want you, working in close conjunction with the JCS, to develop such measures to be integrated with non-SIOP planning. You should seek the advice of appropriate State Department officials and other agencies as necessary, but I want to keep participation in this activity as limited as possible in view of its sensitivity. I would like a preliminary report on the status of your efforts by 30 June 1979.

DECLARATORY POLICY: ISA, in consultation with PA, should develop recommendations for an interim declaratory policy that can be used in responding to press and other inquiries about the Targeting Study.

By March 31st, I would also like your recommendations for proposals that we might make in NATO to both explain our employment policy more clearly to them, and to involve them in future employment planning as closely as possible. These should be submitted through the Under Secretary of State in consultation with the Advisor for NATO Affairs, the JCS, and the Department of State.

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PDASD-D			✓	N				USDR&E	PA&E
SALT				NE				GC	SPEC ASST
LOS				NA				ADV/NATO	
FMRA				A					
ADMIN				AD				ACTION REQUIRED	
				IA				Direct Reply	
DSAA-T								Appropriate Action	✓
TB				IEA-B				Info and Retention	
				BD				Comments/Recommendations	
P			✓	BT				Other:	
PD	✓							Rep for SecDef Signature	
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REMARKS/SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

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