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To : The Secretary
 Through: S/S
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
 Subject: Major Factors Underlying British and German Positions Regarding Nuclear Weapons

For much of the past two years, discussion of the organization of nuclear arrangements within the North Atlantic Alliance has centered almost exclusively on the MLF proposal. The positions taken in these discussions by the two major European participants, the United Kingdom and West Germany, have reflected the concerns of these two governments over their future relations with the United States as much as they have reflected their own basic needs and desires in nuclear matters.

The United States government has now made it clear that it wants the countries of NATO Europe, and in particular the UK and West Germany, to take the lead in developing nuclear proposals of their own before the US commits itself to support any specific plan. It is therefore timely and relevant to examine the fundamental interests and outlooks of these two countries, so as to understand the actions they may take, or equally significantly, may fail to take, in this field. Such an examination will also contribute to an appreciation of the attitudes they have taken thus far towards the MLF idea, and of those they can be expected to take towards related proposals.

ABSTRACT

The two major European participants with the United States in discussion of Atlantic Alliance nuclear affairs are the United Kingdom and Germany. The positions they take regarding nuclear weapons spring from their own perception of national interests and requirements, as follows:

Germany. The most important elements underlying the nuclear weapons policy of the Federal Republic of Germany are related to the military security of West Germany's own territory. Because of Germany's exposed geographical

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position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Germany's disbelief that the territory of the FRG can be defended by conventional means against a large-scale Soviet attack, and Germany's fear of a tactical nuclear battle along NATO's Central Front (that is, in Germany), the Germans consider that credible strategic nuclear deterrence is their only real defense. They rely for that defense on the United States. The Germans recognize that the American commitment to the defense of Germany is secured by the presence on German soil of the equivalent of six US divisions. But Bonn wishes to reinsure US protection by finding new ways to involve American nuclear power even more inextricably in Europe.

This primarily security-oriented aspect of German nuclear weapons policy involves questions of the deployment and command of nuclear weapons, but not of their ownership and control, which are as much political as military in nature. As to ownership and control, although the German Government and most articulate opinion in the Federal Republic reject a national solution, some Germans, in part because of past prodding by the United States, are coming to feel that Germany ought to have a "share" or "voice" in the control of nuclear weapons in the Alliance. Such participation, in the view of these Germans, would increase Germany's ability to influence important Alliance decisions, particularly as to strategy, and would remove the threat of permanent "second-class" status for Germany, behind the UK and France.

There is no agreement in Germany as to what changes, if any, should be made in existing Alliance nuclear arrangements in light of the foregoing considerations. SPD opinion tends to favor an approach based on greater participation in Alliance nuclear-strategic planning and policy making. CDU/CSU opinion espoused the

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shared nuclear ownership and control approach, but was divided as to the eventual place of the United States in the force. However, positions taken within the CDU/CSU on the nuclear question were to some degree distorted by a party power struggle, and by other foreign policy problems. With a national election not too far off, Bonn seems content to shelve the nuclear debate for a while.

When the nuclear question again comes up for active discussion in the Alliance, Germany will seek arrangements that provide for the commitment to NATO of strategic nuclear weapons to cover SACEUR's targets; accord the Federal Republic an important role in nuclear planning and decision-making, and thus, greater status in the Alliance; engage US nuclear power irrevocably in the defense of Europe; and are tolerable to France, or even contain inducements to eventual French participation in some form.

Since Bonn committed itself heavily to many of the specifics of the MLF proposal, deft presentational handling will be required for any plan that does not incorporate these specifics, notably mixed manning of delivery systems and multilateral ownership of weapons. The passage of time will ease this problem for the Germans.

If, as now seems likely, no new plan can be realized that gives the Germans all they want by way of new arrangements, both militarily and politically, then, the Germans will cling most strongly to satisfaction of their military security requirements. In the final analysis, they will have to settle for whatever the US finds acceptable. At bottom, they are aware of their dependence on the US for security, and this assures the US a dominant influence on German defense policy until there is a great shift in East-West relations, or until the Federal Republic is given serious reason to doubt that the US continues to regard German and American security as indivisible.

The UK. The British strategic nuclear deterrent now consists of a force of medium bombers, many of them assigned to NATO. Under the Nassau Agreement with the United States, the UK will in addition acquire four nuclear powered, POLARIS-armed submarines, which under the Agreement will also be NATO-assigned.

Although the present Labor Government, during the election campaign in the fall of 1964, called for the elimination of the "independent" British nuclear deterrent, it now appears to have decided that the UK will remain a nuclear power, which the Conservatives also advocate. Labor, in fact, apparently intends to withdraw some of the bombers from their NATO assignment for deployment "East of Suez." As to the POLARIS submarines, Labor may be prepared to commit them to the Alliance in some optically "irrevocable" form, but it will almost certainly not surrender all title to them, or place them beyond the possibility of recall.

Britain retains extensive and pressing military obligations outside the NATO area. To honor these obligations, the UK is trying to eke out its limited resources with strategic nuclear weapons. Four nuclear bombers have recently been deployed in the neighborhood of Indonesia, obviously in the hope that this will deter Sukarno from intensifying his attack on Malaysia, however doubtful it may be that Britain would actually use nuclear weapons against Indonesia. In the longer term, the UK believes its nuclear power will be needed as a counterpoise to an eventual Chinese capability that threatens South Asia, and the British argue that, in this role, the UK deterrent also serves an anti-proliferational purpose. (India, in particular, might more easily resist pressures to develop her own nuclear weapons if

Indian security against Chinese nuclear attack were to be guaranteed by the UK, as Mr. Harold Wilson has argued.)


As to the British weapons that will remain NATO-committed, their continued existence, Labor may well be concluding, is necessary to assure the UK's status as a first-rate power with special relations to the United States and special influence in the Alliance. The terms on which the British may eventually commit these forces to NATO, even in an ANF type of arrangement, will be such as to perpetuate this special status as a nuclear power, even if it is played down optically.

The British do, it is true, favor some sharing of responsibility in nuclear matters with the non-nuclear members of the Alliance, particularly the Germans, in proportion to their contributions to the military strength of NATO. But they do not believe that this objective can be reached only through measures affecting the ownership and real control of nuclear weapons. They believe that the effort to achieve this goal should be directed toward giving the non-nuclear countries a larger role in shaping strategy and in nuclear policy planning and targeting. The readiness of the UK to accord others a greater influence on strategy and on nuclear policy, however, is limited by British perception of a basic difference between the security situation of the UK and that of the Continental countries, based on geography.

In spite of its campaign pledges, the Labor Government in the UK is not under great domestic pressure to eliminate the British nuclear deterrent. It can defuse such pressures, if they do arise, by emphasizing its disarmament objectives. These objectives, which are genuine, further condition

Labor's attitude toward Alliance nuclear arrangements. At the moment, reluctance to jeopardize the possibility of a non-proliferation agreement with the Soviet Union, for example, is one of the factors generating British coolness toward an MLF component within their proposed ANF.

On pages 16 and 17, we list the general British criteria, emergent from the foregoing analysis, for any new Alliance nuclear arrangements. This is followed by a brief description of the tactics we expect the UK to employ in pursuing its objectives.



The three major European partners of the United States in the North Atlantic Alliance, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, differ markedly in their positions on the relationship of their respective nations to nuclear weapons. France is set upon creating a national nuclear strike force that will be completely under its own control. Although there is some opposition in France to this concept, this opposition is not, nor is it expected for some time to be, important enough to produce any change in French nuclear policy. In the United Kingdom, the question of whether to retain the existing "independent" British nuclear deterrent has seemed to be a major issue between the two principal parties, but their differences may be more polemical than real. The Conservatives want to maintain the deterrent, and the narrowly elected governing Labor Party, which attacked the Conservatives on this score during the recent election campaign, now appears to be moving in a direction that, in substance, is close to the Tory view. In Germany, discussion centers not around the question of creating a national nuclear force, which all responsible elements oppose, but around what military-nuclear role Germany ought to play with other NATO powers, individually or collectively.

It seems clear that as far as the emerging French nuclear force is concerned, United States policy has little room for maneuver. France will have its force and is able to get it without outside assistance (though external aid would ease and accelerate attainment of goals). As to other nuclear arrangements within or outside the North Atlantic Alliance, France's acceptance or rejection of them and its readiness or lack of readiness to cooperate with them will depend upon the extent to which, in Paris' eyes, they support, hinder, or leave unaffected the political objectives which the French force is designed to serve. Since these objectives are relatively open and clear (in making evident President de Gaulle's insistence on the appearance of France's independence of reliance on U.S. nuclear power), it should not be hard to estimate how any particular nuclear proposal that might be advanced would be received in France.*

Unlike the rather straightforwardly nationalistic motives behind French nuclear policy, the rationales for British and German nuclear policies are both complex and involved in domestic political controversy. Moreover, developments of the past few years, principally those connected with the MLF proposal, have tended further to obscure the essentials of the British and German positions on nuclear weapons. Indeed, these developments may themselves have altered those positions in some respects. It seems useful at this stage of affairs, therefore, to set forth the elements that underlie British and German policies and attitudes relating to nuclear weapons, so that these elements can be taken into account when the possibility of devising new nuclear arrangements in the Western Alliance is being explored.

* For a discussion of French nuclear policy, see RM-REU-2, "Notes on French Strategic Doctrine," January 15, 1965. For an analysis of the motives for France's strong recent opposition to the Multilateral Force concept, see RM-REU-70, December 17, 1964.

Germany

Primacy of security considerations. Among the NATO countries of Western Europe, Germany is the one most preoccupied with the physical problems of national security. The long eastern border of the Federal Republic is also the western edge of the Communist world. Within less than 150 miles of that border, in East Germany alone, twenty or more Soviet army divisions -- and a number of East German divisions -- are deployed in a high state of combat readiness; these are supported by many more Soviet and other Warsaw Pact country divisions and by hundreds of MRBM's deployed in the western USSR and targeted on Western Europe. Within West Germany itself, the troops of six other NATO countries provide a constant reminder of the central position which Germany holds in the East-West confrontation. In the event of a conflict in Europe, any Soviet advance would, from the very outset, mean the loss of West German territory, and that territory could be recovered only at great cost to German lives and property. Thus, for the Germans, NATO's official "forward strategy," that is, the concept of maintaining the territorial integrity of the NATO area without any intention to make a major withdrawal, is a matter of stark survival.

German view of a credible deterrent strategy. The Germans apparently have come to accept the general thesis of the United States that Western strategic nuclear power alone, given the strength of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, can no longer be considered fully credible as a deterrent against any Soviet attack on Europe that is not of an all-out character. They agree that strategic nuclear deterrence can gain the additional credibility it needs against this type of aggression by increasing the West's capacity to fight at a lower level, thus demonstrating serious intent. This lower-level capability, as they see it, must be so constructed as to (1) prevent a rapid enemy advance into Germany; and (2) clearly threaten escalation of the conflict.

The Germans do not think that their territory can be credibly defended by conventional means against a large-scale Soviet attack, even a non-nuclear one. They therefore hold that the forces defending the West German border must be armed with nuclear air defense, interdiction and battlefield weapons. They assert that nuclear air defense and interdiction weapons must be used virtually as soon as an enemy advance begins. If these fail to halt the enemy advance, it will be necessary to oppose him with battlefield nuclear weapons. The attacker will then supposedly become aware that if he pursues his attack further at this stage of hostilities, escalation to the tactical-strategic nuclear phase will be swift and inevitable, so that his choice will lie between discontinuing his attack without having made a significant gain, and all-out strategic nuclear war.

This is not to imply, of course, that the Germans actually expect the use of any nuclear weapons on their territory in an East-West conflict. They are aware that this would cause great devastation. Rather, they believe that the forward deployment of smaller nuclear weapons, credibly supported by the threat of escalation to the strategic level, would ensure that there would be no hostilities. In other words, there would be effective deterrence.

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Key role of nuclear weapons. The difference between the German emphasis on the early use of nuclear weapons and the US insistence on a build-up of non-nuclear capabilities is more than a difference of tactical doctrine. It is also a divergence in political approach and in the analysis of the military problem. The Germans probably fear that too much emphasis on non-nuclear capability will convey to the Soviet Union an impression of unreadiness to use strategic nuclear weapons, an impression that might lead to a miscalculation. The German motive in emphasizing smaller nuclear weapons is, at least in part, an expression of a determination to keep nuclear deterrence in general, and strategic nuclear deterrence in particular, in the forefront of defense.

There are also German-American differences on command and control arrangements for smaller nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons are deployed far forward, as the Germans see it, it is essential that they be, and be known to be, under command and control arrangements that enable them to be used on short notice. Although the Germans do not dispute the ultimate decision-making power of the President of the United States respecting the use of nuclear weapons, they have expressed concern lest the arrangements for executing this decision, once taken, be too cumbersome. Former Chancellor Adenauer on several occasions publicly expressed his unease on this score. He even proposed giving NATO the authority to order the use of atomic weapons, without specifying what NATO instrumentality he had in mind.

Problem of assuring the US commitment. Our analysis has so far dealt with German views as to how to create a defense that will be credible to the Soviets. This defense rests on strategic nuclear deterrence, and thus, on an outside power, the United States. This leads the Germans, inevitably, to ask themselves, how secure and durable the American commitment is.

No German in public life likes to raise this issue. To question the American commitment might antagonize the United States, and would also seem to cast doubt on the wisdom of Germany's security policy, based as it is on American power. But among themselves, some leading Germans do express fear of an eventual American disengagement.

The Germans consider that they now have, with the presence of six US divisions on their soil, adequate assurances of America's commitment to Germany's defense. But they cannot be sure that all or any of these divisions will always remain in Germany. Although they seek to conceal their insecurity in this respect, it comes to the surface each time there is talk in Washington of such matters as the balance of payments problems allegedly connected with US troop deployment abroad and the new mobility concepts that would enable American combat troops now deployed overseas to be concentrated in the US. Although German fears have been calmed in each past case, a residue of worry remains. Thus, the desire to nail American nuclear power down more securely, permanently, and inextricably in Europe is another object of German policy.

SACEUR's MRBM requirement. The prospect of achieving this arose for the Germans when, in late 1956, a meeting of the NATO Heads of Government decided that MRBM's (then IRBM's) ought to be put at the disposal of SACEUR. These MRBM's were thought necessary to counter the increasing numbers of Soviet MRBM's

deployed in the Western Soviet Union against targets in Western Europe. Implementation of this Heads-of-Governments decision was to give SACEUR a strategic, in addition to tactical capability, and to provide against the eventual obsolescence of the command's manned strike aircraft. SACEUR welcomed the Heads-of-Governments decision and has, since it was made, submitted requirements for increasing numbers of MRBM's of several kinds. But for various reasons that will not be examined here, SACEUR's stated requirements have not been filled, or even formally approved at the political level.

The Germans have strongly and consistently supported the filling of SACEUR's MRBM requirement. They agree with SACEUR that a good proportion of his MRBM's should be land-based, and thus under his immediate control. Achievement of this objective would place in Europe itself, under the same NATO commander to whom all German armed forces are assigned, and in whose planning efforts German officers participate, more of the means necessary to defend Germany. It would also (assuming that the US would provide the MRBM's or at least the warheads) engage the US even more deeply in Europe.

The United States, while making gestures toward SACEUR in the form of assigning a few POLARIS submarines to his command, has by and large dismissed his MRBM requirement as not militarily urgent. The US has contended that its own strategic nuclear forces, not committed to NATO but available for NATO defense, adequately cover SACEUR's strategic targets.* In the face of past American coolness toward MRBM's for SACEUR, especially MRBM's land-based in Europe, the Germans have found it politic to mute their support for them. Nevertheless, they continue to find occasion to remind others that the requirement is still unsatisfied and ought to be met.

* Since SACEUR's requirement, however, was sometimes adduced as one argument for the MLF--and ANF--which the U S has backed, the United States position on SACEUR's nuclear needs is now ambiguous. The conflict between the British ANF proposal that the new force be placed under a separate command and German-Italian insistence that it be subordinated to SACEUR may push the U S to take a stand on this matter in an effort to resolve the dispute.

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The nuclear ownership and control question. SACEUR's MRBM requirement involves questions of command organization and of the deployment of nuclear weapons, not of their ownership or of the ultimate control of their use. Insofar as the ownership and control of nuclear weapons are concerned, German attitudes are harder to pin down. It bears repeating, however, that the German Government and the overwhelming bulk of the articulate German public have not sought national ownership or control of nuclear weapons. There is a very widespread understanding that the possibilities open to West Germany on this score are decidedly different from those open to France and Great Britain. The Germans know that a German nuclear force (or even a Franco-German force*) would not satisfy Germany's nuclear defense requirements but could easily alienate the US and lead Washington to distance itself militarily from Germany. Almost everyone in the Federal Republic is also aware that German possession and control of nuclear weapons would strongly antagonize the Soviet Union, and that this, in addition to increasing the threat to Germany's security, would dash any hopes of progress toward reunification. A German nuclear force would, moreover, immeasurably damage Germany's carefully cultivated relations with its Western European allies, and set at naught German efforts to build new bridges to Eastern Europe.

Germany's wish for a "share" in control. This situation in Germany in regard to national nuclear arms is likely to continue to prevail for a long time to come. At the same time, it is by no means inconsistent to note that there are signs that some Germans, owing in part to past prodding by the US, are coming to feel that it is unnatural for Germany not to want some "share" or "voice" in the control of nuclear weapons in the Alliance, whatever this may mean. To the extent that this feeling exists, it is probably traceable to two causes: (1) the belief that Germany, given her sizable military contribution to NATO, ought to have more influence in NATO councils, particularly in respect to overall strategy, and that this can be obtained only by meaningful participation in basic decisions involving nuclear weapons; (2) the fear that Germany will somehow lapse into "second-class status" unless it acquires some role in nuclear control -- in fact, a role equal to that of the UK and comparable to that aspired to by France.

The first of these two factors, influence in the Alliance, has of course, both military and political aspects. Germany wants not only recognition of its own contribution to NATO, but also a greater ability than it now has to ensure that major Alliance decisions are not prejudicial to German interests, as Bonn sees them.

The "status" factor. The second factor, status, is almost entirely political, and it is highly elusive. Before the French force de frappe got off the drawing board, the Germans were not talking about first- and second-class status. The

* A Franco-German force is mentioned here purely as a theoretical possibility. In fact, France has clearly stated its adamant opposition, on both political and security grounds, to any close German association in the control of nuclear weapons. Any French offer to the Germans of a "partnership" in the force de frappe would be on the basis of continued and absolute French control.

fact that the British had their own nuclear force did not then disturb Germany. Only the incipient emergence of the French force into being seems to have produced some German grumbling over status. There is no clear answer as to why this should be. Since 1945, the Germans have not sought national prestige for its own sake. On the contrary, they have been notably unassertive. And it is highly unlikely that the Germans think that the French or British forces could ever be directed against them militarily.

The Germans who worry about nuclear status have not explained precisely what lies at the root of these ruminations. Perhaps they believe that the French will derive from their nuclear force a psychological advantage of some kind that will ensure for them undisputed leadership and commensurate advantage in Western Europe, a leadership that these Germans are not prepared to concede. Perhaps -- and this is related to the factor of influence in the Alliance -- they believe that a nuclear France will eventually be able to bring about the formation of the tripartite US-UK-French "directoriate," which de Gaulle has advocated since 1958, or even a US-French duumvirate, running the free-world show. Perhaps they believe that Germany cannot afford to miss out on the special technological benefits which, as the French contend, may accrue to countries with nuclear weapons program. In any case, German uneasiness at continuing total isolation from Alliance nuclear weapon affairs (despite existing "two-key" bilateral arrangements with the US on tactical nuclear arms) is likely to spread if there is significant additional proliferation in the world to such countries as India, Sweden, or the UAR, which are obviously inferior to the FRG in overall national strength.

No German consensus on the solution. As a result of all of these considerations, military and political, many Germans conclude that there is need for some change in the existing situation in the Alliance regarding the control of nuclear weapons. Yet, there is no consensus in Germany as to what form the change should take. The Socialist Party sees no need for major changes; it believes that ownership and ultimate control of nuclear weapons should reside in the United States, with the other allies given a larger role than at present in planning and policy formation regarding deployment and use. The Socialists were prepared to accept the "sharing of ownership" approach incorporated in the MLF, but without enthusiasm, and only because they thought it was wanted by the United States.

In the CDU, opinion is divided, although not to the extent sometimes thought. The Schroeder-von Hassel school, the so-called Atlanticists, came to favor the approach embodied in the MLF: acquisition of a share of nuclear ownership and of a vote on use, symbolizing Germany's "equality" in NATO. Although some members of this group, notably von Hassel, at first toyed with the idea of eventual termination of the US veto over use of the force and its ultimate "Europeanization," they soon came to see that this could not be reconciled with another objective of the MLF that was fundamental from the German point of view: viz., the creation of an institution that would permanently tie US nuclear power

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to the defense of Germany. Hence, these same people subsequently grew very vague about any possible future withdrawal of the US veto. (This well illustrates the German security dilemma as a whole: a desire to become less evidently dependent upon the United States coupled with a horror of losing American protection.)

Another group in the CDU/CSU, led by Strauss and Guttenberg, the so-called "Gaullists," has advocated different things at different times. As nearly as can be discerned, their present position, whose formulation was stimulated by the MLF discussion, is this: Europe ought to pull its weight and increase its influence in the Atlantic Alliance by having its own nuclear force, which should be coordinated with US nuclear power in a sort of nuclear dumbbell. Such a European force will be possible only when Europe is politically unified and therefore able to control it. That time is a long way off. In the meantime, some such scheme as the MLF might be acceptable, but only if it were clearly to provide for evolution towards eventual European control (with or without continued US participation). In this way, it might better allow for later collaboration with the force de frappe and might thus contribute to the achievement of European unity rather than to its retardation.

Confusion of the nuclear question with other issues. It is hard to say how genuinely either of these two CDU positions is held. Even as the nuclear question was being actively advanced for consideration by the United States in late 1962 and early 1963, it got snarled up in what was widely viewed as a Franco-American contest over the future organization and orientation of Europe. Support of the MLF, led by Foreign Minister Schroeder, came to be identified in Germany with backing for American leadership of the alliance. Opposition to Schroeder, particularly as personified in Strauss, assumed the guise of coolness toward the MLF and was equated by some with support of France against the US.

In fact, Schroeder supports Western European political integration as strongly as his opponents in the CDU/CSU, while they appreciate as much as does Schroeder the importance to Germany of the security tie with the United States. Schroeder's opponents were helped by the French, who warned that a nuclear role for Germany could not be reconciled with German reunification. As it worked out, Schroeder ended up heavily committed to a project that caused trouble with France and thereby ran afoul of another major German foreign policy objective, Franco-German rapprochement and European unity. Schroeder's opponents, having neither endorsed nor really attacked the MLF, can now enjoy Schroeder's discomfiture, to them a pearl of greater price than the creation or non-creation of the MLF.

The nuclear question has now become mixed up with so many other things in Germany that most Germans are probably content to relax for some period before it is again tabled for active discussion. Although this issue has still not aroused much public interest and is not a matter of debate on substance between the major parties, the attention which it focuses on Germany's position between France and the US is particularly unwelcome with a national election in the offing in the autumn of 1965. If nothing else, it exposes the Bonn Government to charges of ineptitude.

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Sooner or later, however, the question of new nuclear arrangements will almost surely again come to the fore on the agenda. In fact, low-level diplomatic exchanges among Rome, Bonn, and London on ANF issues are even now taking place and could lead to multilateral meetings (with US participation) even before the West German elections. However, Chancellor Erhard has declared that his government will make no commitment on the ANF until after elections, and it is too early to say whether, in fact, the problem will be pressed towards some early resolution even after that event. This will depend on a variety of developments on which predictions cannot yet be made, such as the election results, the standing of the Labor Government in the UK, the result of efforts to create political (and, possibly, defense) consultative institutions among the Six, de Gaulle's position nine months hence, the evolution of the FRG's policy towards East Germany, Eastern Europe and the USSR, and overall East-West relations.

German nuclear desiderata. Nevertheless, whenever the nuclear problem again returns to the limelight, the Germans will certainly want any agreement to involve a number of key elements. (1) They will seek the inclusion of strategic nuclear delivery systems committed to NATO and used to cover SACEUR's targets, preferably in the form of MRBM's deployed on or near continental Western Europe and assigned to SACEUR. (2) They will urge the creation of new organizational structures, or modification of old ones, so as to ensure that Germany will play an important role in strategic planning and in the making of basic decisions involving nuclear weapons (thereby gaining status in the Alliance and narrowing the gap between Bonn's present position and that of London and Paris). (3) They will attempt to make engagement of the United States as irrevocable as possible in the nuclear defense of Europe. (4) They will try to find inducements to attain eventual French participation or association, or at least French toleration of the scheme, so as to prevent its becoming an obstacle to progress toward European political unity and Franco-German entente.

There are evidently several paradoxes within this list of criteria. Inextricable involvement of the United States implies a perpetual US veto over the use of the nuclear weapons involved. Yet this imposes limits on the extent to which other countries could share, or even appear to share, in control over the weapons. As another example, the willingness of France to participate in the arrangements, or even to tolerate them, would be reduced by the extent to which (a) they decreased France's edge over Germany and (b) they enhanced the role accorded SACEUR.

Presentational problems. The handling of the presentational aspect of any proposal will be very important for the Germans. They committed themselves heavily and publicly to some of the specifics of the MLF scheme, especially mixed manning and multilateral ownership. It was these two aspects of the MLF that seemed to them to offer the most in terms of gains in status. Neither was fundamental in terms of security nor was either in principle essential to obtain a greater share in nuclear strategy decisions. Yet it was these same aspects

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that caused the most trouble elsewhere, notably with France and the Soviet Union. It is thus possible that the Germans may conclude that getting a degree of ownership of and manpower participation in operating strategic nuclear weapons creates more problems for them than it solves. At the same time, we recognize that their vigorous public commitment to multilateral ownership and manning during the MLF discussions will make it awkward for them to drop these professed objectives, unless, perhaps, the SPD acquires a major role in policy-making after the fall elections. On the other hand, if a certain amount of time elapses before the nuclear dialogue is resumed in earnest, as Germany now hopes, it will become easier for Bonn to revise previous positions.

Security requirements limit German power of choice. In the last analysis, the Germans will have no choice but to take whatever they are finally offered, at least by the US. If they must choose among desiderata, they will probably go after the security objectives first: maximum visible assurance of coverage of SACEUR's MRBM targets in a form binding on the US. They will also try to salvage some appearance of a gain in status. If they get disappointingly little, they will have to live with their disappointment.* No one but the United States is likely to offer them, or can offer them, arrangements which will give more national security than they now have. This is a central fact of life in Germany. It assures the US a dominant influence on German defense policy until German perception of basic security requirements changes (which would entail a great shift in overall East-West relations), or Germany is given serious reason to believe that its security is no longer a vital interest of the United States.

The UK

A description of the British nuclear deterrent. The British independent nuclear deterrent now consists of Victor and Vulcan medium bombers, so-called V-Bombers, each of which carries one nuclear bomb. The range of these bombers enables them to reach the western part of the Soviet Union. Of a total of 177 V-Bombers now in the inventory, 120 are assigned to NATO under SACEUR, but the UK retains effective control over them. A program of technical modification has been carried out to prolong the effective life of the V-Bombers as a credible weapons system into the early 1970's.

Under the 1962 Nassau Agreement with the United States, the British are also building four nuclear powered missile submarines, for which the United States has agreed to sell POLARIS missiles. The nuclear warheads for the missiles will be produced by the British. Under the US-UK agreement, these submarines, when built, are to be assigned to NATO. It cannot now be said how long POLARIS submarines will remain an effective deterrent weapons system, but it is currently thought that their useful life should extend at least into the late 1970's or 1980's.

* It goes without saying, of course, that it would be contrary to US interests to foster sentiments of disgruntlement with the US and other allies in German public opinion. This factor will, therefore, presumably be of some importance in the terms finally offered to Bonn on nuclear matters.

It now appears that the British Labor Government intends to withdraw some V-Bombers from NATC assignment in order to use them for other purposes related to UK military commitments "East of Suez." As to the submarines, Labor pre-election campaign talk of "renegotiating" or "denegotiating" the Nassau Agreement, with the implication that the submarines might not be acquired at all (or, if acquired, might be converted to an exclusively hunter-killer role), has not been heard since the election. As it turned out, the debate within the Labor government soon centered not on whether to acquire the POLARIS subs, but on how many to acquire. (Five was the number foreseen in the Nassau Agreement. The keels of two of them had been laid at the time the Labor Government took office. The decision to complete four has just been made.)

A third nuclear delivery system with a potential strategic capability is the controversial TSR-2 aircraft. Before the Labor Party came to office, it denounced the TSR-2 project as a colossal waste of money and it still considers expenditures on it to be militarily unjustifiable, but it has now deferred a decision on liquidating the project because of domestic political and economic considerations. The decision is, of course, tied in with the general question of the future of the British aircraft industry, a sizable employer with a voluble, well unionized, and influential labor force. This, and the consideration that the TSR-2 is primarily designed for a high-altitude reconnaissance and tactical strike role, make it an imperfect touchstone for Labor policy on the strategic nuclear deterrent, and it will therefore not be considered further in this study.

The Labor Government's ANF proposal. Labor, then, given its apparent intentions in regard to keeping the V-Bombers and the POLARIS submarines, is showing no signs of dumping British strategic nuclear weapons into the sea, or even of allowing the deterrent to waste away through obsolescence. If its present views can rightly be read from its proposal last fall of an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), its desires seem, rather, to involve these elements: retaining an independent nuclear deterrent for use outside the NATO area, in the form of a sizable number of V-Bombers; assigning to the ANF, and through it, to NATO, the POLARIS submarines when they become operational, and the remainder of the V-Bomber force, with the possibility of multilateral "mixed" manning for the V-Bombers; and making this assignment "irrevocable" for the life of the Alliance.

The British apparently contemplate UK national manning for the submarines, and they would retain at least residual title to them. Thus, even apart from the V-Bombers, the submarines (and the continued manufacture of nuclear warheads for their POLARIS missiles) would seem to guarantee the UK's status as a nuclear power. Indeed, it has been openly doubted in Britain whether any nation in a supreme national emergency would forego the use of weapons owned by itself and manned by its nationals (such as the four submarines) however "irrevocably" they may have been assigned on paper.

It is true that in British-American talks on nuclear matters during the last few months, consideration has been given to the installation of permissive action

links (PALS) in the nuclear warheads to be put on UK POLARIS submarines, so as to make it technically impossible for these to be armed for firing by British decision alone without authority from the ANF command and control center. But in view of the factors considered further on in this paper, it seems probable that the UK, even if it finally agrees to the installation of PALS in the warheads, will nonetheless reject arrangements that would place the submarines themselves beyond all possibility of British recovery. In fact, any such arrangements would be inconsistent with Britain's ultimate reversionary or residual rights in the submarines. And if the UK goes on producing its own nuclear warheads, it could always use new ones to replace those warheads on the POLARIS missiles into which PALS had been built. In this light, although London's tactic will probably be to seek to torpedo any PALS proposal by technical arguments, by demanding an exorbitant price, or simply by stalling, rather than by a refusal on the principle, it cannot be excluded that the UK might ultimately accept some such system. It would, in any case, be more a gesture of political solidarity with the US and a visual accommodation with Bonn than a meaningful military move, especially since the idea of British use of its strategic nuclear capacity without prior concurrence from Washington taxes the imagination.

UK to remain a nuclear power. To cut through the rhetoric, the Labor Government is, in practice, hewing to the nuclear policy of its Tory predecessors as reflected in the Nassau Agreement and subsequent actions, with these differences: it would withhold from NATO assignment for purely national purposes as many as half the V-Bombers, whereas the entire V-Bomber Force was, in principle -- though not in fact -- committed by the Conservative Government; it would entertain the idea of mixed-manning of those of the V-Bombers that remain NATO-committed, a concept that was not expected to arouse and has not aroused enthusiasm in other countries, such as Germany; it would assign the NATO-committed V-Bombers and the eventual POLARIS submarines "irrevocably for the life of the Alliance," an undertaking of questionable military significance and enforceability, though, presumably, of some political utility; and it seems even less receptive than the previous government to the idea of British participation in a multilaterally owned and manned fleet of POLARIS-armed surface ships.

For the purpose of this analysis, it is not necessary to judge whether the Labor Government views its ANF proposal as a serious one, or as a tactic to sidetrack the MLF, while, at the same time, giving the appearance of a major effort to fulfill a campaign pledge to get rid of the "independent" British deterrent. It is not necessary to judge this because the effect of the ANF on the UK's own nuclear situation, even if it were implemented, would not be fundamental: the UK would retain de facto ultimate control of a strategic nuclear force for a long time to come. It might, it is true, agree to some impairment of its national control over parts of this force. In return, it would expect to acquire major influence over any ANF components in which it did not participate.

In the following discussion, we attempt to bring out the underlying reasons why the Labor Government's nuclear policy has not deviated sharply from that of the previous Conservative Government and will probably not change drastically in the future.

British military obligations and resources. Unlike the other countries of NATO Europe, the UK still has extensive and pressing military obligations outside the NATO area. There is agreement in the UK that security commitments in the Commonwealth and in the remaining colonies must be honored. But there is also agreement that there should be no increase in the share of national product devoted to defense, and that every effort should be made to avoid reintroducing conscription.

Any British government, constrained by these considerations, must do a lot of juggling of existing military resources, and can spare none. The UK has withdrawn some forces, principally naval units, from NATO commitment, for use east of Suez, but there are political limits on the extent to which the British can draw down their military account in Europe, which includes principally the British Army of the Rhine. Moreover, the UK is in any case simply not large and populous enough to meet foreseeable Commonwealth security obligations with conventional manpower alone, especially under peacetime conditions.

Extra-European role for nuclear weapons. The Labor Government has recently deployed a small number of V-Bombers to the Southeast Asia area, although it seems most doubtful that the UK would ever use nuclear weapons against Indonesia. Deployment of the bombers may in this case be a stop-gap, an attempt to bluff Indonesia out of intensifying the campaign against Malaysia and thus increasing the pressures on Britain's already overtaxed conventional strength. Whatever the intent of the move, it implies that Labor is prepared to make use of what it has, nuclear if need be, where vital security interests are at stake.

When Prime Minister Wilson, in a recent television interview, was questioned about the policy implications of sending the V-Bombers to the Southeast Asia area, he reportedly replied in these terms:

This country's strength is going to depend on our world role and not being corralled in Europe.... We now have the situation of the Chinese nuclear weapon. We have non-nuclear countries, including India, who want some safeguards against that, otherwise we are going to find India, Pakistan and all countries in Asia, and perhaps Indonesia before long, and the Middle East, becoming nuclear powers. Once this happens, world nuclear war is inevitable.... We attach the greatest priority this year to working out with our allies some kind of force to protect non-nuclear powers against the threat of the Chinese bomb.

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Labor and Tory rationales compared. What Labor now seems to be saying in effect is that the Tories erred, not in having an independent nuclear deterrent, but rather, in the strategic role to which they assigned it. For the Conservatives, the strategic considerations justifying an independent British nuclear deterrent centered about defense of the UK itself. They argued publicly that Britain's force added measurably to the credibility of American nuclear power as a deterrent against Soviet aggression in the West. In addition, less officially, some Tories hinted at acceptance of the Gaullist line of the possible unreliability of American promises to protect NATO countries with US nuclear weapons, which required an independent British capability for use in extremis.

For Labor, the strategic justification is extra-NATO and extra-European: nuclear deterrence to defend the Commonwealth. Whether or not the dispatch of four V-Bombers to Australia deters Indonesia, there is still -- and Labor has already made this argument -- the Chinese bomb, and therefore a long-term nuclear deterrent role for the British in defense of India. That this can be enunciated in the name of anti-proliferation, and presented as a temporary necessity pending international guarantees, makes it a little easier for Labor to swallow. And whether the United States approves or not, the US will not be in a position to object unless it is prepared at the same time to assume some current British responsibilities in the Indian Ocean-Southeast Asia area, something the British would very much like, but a commitment from which America has so far shied away.

The Labor Government is now talking of reserving about half the V-Bombers for the extra-European uses just discussed. There remains the question of the rationale for the other V-Bombers, and the POLARIS submarines to come. Taking account of Labor's offer to commit the planes and submarines to NATO "irrevocably" under certain circumstances, and of Labor's view that Britain's main military role lies outside Europe, what British interests are served by the existence of these systems?

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Nuclear weapons and status. The answer, for Laborite as for Tory before him, lies in political power and influence. Although Labor scoffed at Tory claims that the British deterrent gave the UK a "seat at the top table" in international negotiations, the Labor Government has already learned that it does exactly that. The key role that Britain is now playing in the Alliance nuclear discussion, and London's ability to influence its outcome, stem in good measure from the possession of a significant present and future nuclear capability. No British government is likely to throw such a card away.

The Labor Government is also observing, with some nervousness, indications that the US, motivated in part by a desire for coordination of the force de frappe with SAC, may wish to work out a de facto accommodation with France in the military field. The UK does not object in principle to nuclear cooperation with France. Indeed, it hopes for the eventual coordination of the force de frappe with the other nuclear forces of the Alliance. But, as London has told Washington, the UK would be greatly embarrassed by a US-French agreement through which France gained status and bettered its position with the US by virtue of possession of its own national nuclear force, if Britain were at the same time relinquishing control of the UK deterrent. No matter what reassurances may be forthcoming from Washington, the lesson will again have been driven home to Labor: when it comes to status in the Alliance, a "nuc" in the hand is worth two in a pool.

The British are not willing to run the risk of finding themselves seated with the non-nuclear NATO powers below the salt, or half way between them and the nuclear powers at the head of the NATO table, the US and France. And they may well conclude that they can foreclose this possibility only by retaining control over all or most of their own nuclear arsenal. Even if they eventually agree to some sort of optical sharing of control of the larger part of their force with others in the Alliance, it will be on terms that accord de facto recognition to the UK as a nuclear power and assure the UK continued close and special partnership with the US. In the nature of things, this cannot be expected if the UK really gives up an intimate relationship to its nuclear weapons, whatever the external guise in which this relationship is clothed.

Sharing nuclear responsibility in NATO. It remains true, however, that the British have argued for a greater sharing of responsibility in nuclear matters among the various members of the Alliance. Neither the Conservatives nor the Laborites have espoused the view that an alleged present or future German lust for nuclear weapons (which London does not, in any event, accept as proven) can only be met by the adoption of measures affecting the ownership and control of nuclear weapons themselves. Rather, the British have felt that the effort to meet the basic problem of harmonizing the positions and responsibilities of the nuclear and non-nuclear members of NATO should be directed toward the sharing by the nuclear countries with the non-nuclear countries, in proportion to the contributions of the latter to NATO defense, of participation in Alliance strategy and nuclear policy planning and targeting.

Moreover, the British are well aware of their long-term political and economic interest in good relations with West Germany (and Italy) and are prepared to demonstrate London's bona fides by a certain show of forthcomingness in regard to Alliance nuclear matters. A concurrent desire to avoid undertaking

new nuclear arrangements which might seriously disturb UK-French relations will also play its part in Whitehall's calculations, but, for the most part, the British fear of antagonizing de Gaulle will be less acute than Bonn's, and London can, therefore, be guided on this problem by German sensitivity to possible reverberations that would be likely to be caused in the Elysee by any specific ANF-type nuclear accord.

Limits on sharing control of strategy. At the same time, the UK's readiness to accord other West Europeans greater influence in nuclear-strategic matters has its limits, and they are probably quite low. These limits stem from British perception of a basic difference between the security situation of the UK and that of Continental countries. Britain is an island, able to be destroyed by a strategic nuclear strike, unthreatened by limited attack. The British therefore do not want vital Alliance strategic decisions to be bound up too closely with the tactical problems of NATO's Central Front in Germany. This is reflected in the UK's opposition to a strategic nuclear capability for SACEUR, the NATO commander whose major concern is the defense of the Central Front. (Although the British did nominally assign strategic V-Bombers to SACEUR in 1963 under the pressure of the Nassau Agreement, this must be regarded as an enforced aberration from British policy, not a change in policy.) These considerations check British willingness to parcel out shares in nuclear strategic planning.

Domestic pressures manageable. In plotting its nuclear course, Labor is relatively free of strong domestic pressure to make good its pre-election pledges by getting rid of the British deterrent. The election itself was surely no mandate from the people to do so. And there has been as yet no serious outcry from unilateral disarmers or ban-the-bombers in Labor's own ranks, although this may be a honeymoon phenomenon. Moreover, those in the UK who are most likely eventually to chafe under a lack of progress toward abandonment of the nuclear deterrent are, for the most part, the same people who would most strongly oppose any solution that seemed to bring Germany closer to nuclear weapons. These people would probably accept a continuation of British control over nuclear weapons in preference to new arrangements that involved acquisition of any degree of real control by the Germans. Moreover, these leftist and pacifist-inclined circles in Britain could be further mollified if the British Government at the same time emphasized international disarmament objectives as the ultimate solution and offered proposals along those lines.

Alliance nuclear arrangements and disarmament. British interest in progress toward arms control and disarmament agreements, shared in all three important political parties, is the last of the factors we have to consider. The UK has a realistic appreciation of the relationship between disarmament and security, and it recognizes that Western and Soviet security interests differ widely and make general disarmament a remote prospect. It understands that limited agreements, such as the partial nuclear test ban treaty, do not in themselves constitute much in the way of movement toward arms control and disarmament. Nevertheless, it values such agreements highly despite their shortcomings as disarmament measures. It considers that they improve the East-West atmosphere and thereby produce better conditions in which negotiation of more important agreements, hopefully including those on disarmament, can be conducted.

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These considerations, although they are not decisive, are among those thrown onto the scales when the UK weighs propositions involving nuclear weapons arrangements in the Western Alliance. Just now, when steps to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons are a major object of disarmament negotiations, the British would be reluctant to muddy the waters with any new Western arrangement that might appear inconsistent with nuclear non-dissemination. Since Britain is already a nuclear power, a decision to retain the deterrent would not need to interfere with the conclusion of some sort of non-proliferation agreement, nor has the Soviet Union ever hinted that it would. But the British fear that new Alliance arrangements, whether or not they involved British weapons, could make the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement difficult or impossible, if these arrangements involved any real sharing of control with non-nuclear powers. This will be another factor of which the British take account in the Alliance nuclear discussion, and it reinforces their reluctance to have an MLF created within the ANF, even without British participation in this MLF.

British criteria for Alliance nuclear arrangements. In accordance with British interests as we have analysed them in this paper, it is to be expected that the UK will seek to have any new Alliance nuclear arrangements meet these criteria, with allowances for possible modification of some of them in the course of negotiation:

- (1) the arrangements should leave the UK with uninhibited national control over some portion of the British deterrent; arrangements for the remainder should be such that British national control would not be beyond the power of the UK to reassert, even if its outward appearance were minimized;
- (2) the arrangements should increase the participation of non-nuclear NATO countries, especially Germany, in nuclear planning, targeting, and deployment, as well as in the formulation of Alliance strategy, but without diluting the ultimate control of the President of the United States over the use of nuclear weapons in defense of NATO territory;
- (3) the arrangements should involve the assignment of British components to an ANF, particularly POLARIS submarines; if a Labor government is in power, the terms of this assignment should take such a form, optically, as to allow the Government to claim some degree of fulfillment of its campaign commitment to abandon the British national deterrent;
- (4) generally, in return for its contributions, the UK should be de facto a senior partner in the enterprise; that is, its status as a nuclear power, and the special relationship with the United States that this status has brought in the past, should be at least tacitly recognized in the arrangements;
- (5) specifically, British contributions to a new force should secure for the UK a major role in its direction and a veto over its use;
- (6) the arrangements should not result in an increase in the British defense budget; it should preferably result in decreased UK nuclear expenditures (if, for example, mixed manning of British V-Bombers is provided for, the

British will want others to share the operating and maintenance costs);

(7) the arrangements should not involve participation in the ownership of nuclear weapons by countries that are now non-nuclear, although it could involve their joint ownership of delivery systems; preferably, this latter enterprise should not involve the creation of a mixed-manned fleet of POLARIS-armed surface vessels;

(8) non-nuclear members of the ANF should undertake a pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Probable British tactics. Tactically, the British will, for the immediate future, probably show continuing and "honorable," but not urgent, interest in discussion of new nuclear arrangements. They will avoid final commitments on questions involving British weapons and delivery systems in order to retain maximum options for the time when hard negotiations begin, if and when that point is reached. If no new arrangements evolve, the UK will then probably commit its POLARIS submarines, when it has them, to NATO according to the Nassau Agreement. A Labor Government might even go beyond Nassau and make such a commitment "irrevocable." In the meantime, through its ostensible interest in pursuing new arrangements, it would have laid the basis for a claim to the Labor electorate that it had tried sincerely to honor its campaign pledges in a manner consistent with UK national security.

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