


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Authority NND969057
By K.C. NARA Date 12/30/87

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

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WITH RESTRICTED DATA ATTACHMENTS

7/8/71
July 8, 1971

To: The Acting Secretary
From: *PM* Ronald I. Spiers

US-UK Nuclear Relations: NSSM 123

NODIS REVIEW	
Cat. A - Caption removed;	transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC	with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody	retained by S/S
Reviewed by:	<i>John Brogan</i>
	<i>20 Dec 1971</i>

NSSM 123 (Tab E) called for a review of our nuclear relations with the UK. On July 1 we briefed you on the issues (Tab D) and the study which had been prepared in response to NSSM 123 (Tab C). The NSC Staff has now asked for agency views on the paper and the policy options contained therein (Tab B).

We find the report satisfactory. Because we do not wish to restrict the nuclear cooperative program with the UK unless there are overriding political reasons we believe that we should support sub-option 2b, which provides for maximum flexibility in executing the program but a case by case review of any potentially troublesome issues. As brought out in the briefing, we believe that it is particularly important in the period ahead that Defense keep the Department abreast of those operational aspects of the cooperative nuclear program with the UK which may have political overtones.

21
Nuclear cooperative programs

Recommendations:
That you
(a) endorse sub-option 2b.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

NODIS REVIEW	
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Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC	with additional access controlled by S/S
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Reviewed by:	<i>Allen</i>
Date:	<i>8/1 1978</i>

NODIS REVIEW	
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Reviewed by:	<i>[Signature]</i>
Date:	<i>7/19 71</i>

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(b) Approve the attached Eliot to Kissinger Memorandum (Tab A).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab A - Eliot/Kissinger Memorandum
- Tab B - NSC Memorandum of July 2
- Tab C - NSSM 123 Report
- Tab D - Briefing Memorandum of June 30
- Tab E - NSSM 123

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WITH RD ATTACHMENTS

Drafted: PM/AE:JTKendrick:bpw
7/8/71 x20620

Concurrences: 
L/PM - Mr. Fields
EUR - Mr. Hillenbrand  (draft)

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By KC NARA Date 12/30/86

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7/9/71

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Department of State Position on Response
to NSSM 123 -- US-UK Nuclear Relations

The Department of State is satisfied with the study on US-UK Nuclear Relations (response to NSSM 123) as drafted. The Department favors sub-option 2b (page 39). The Department recommends that the supplementary action outlined under "Operational Considerations" (pages 40-42) be carried out.

The Department of State fully endorses the program of cooperation with HMG on Super Antelope; it realizes, however, that there may be some aspects of the program, as the study points out, which would be ill-timed and have adverse political impact during the forthcoming period. It is for this reason that the Department, while not wishing to interfere with the operational aspects of the project, supports establishment of a coordination process that will bring to its attention in timely fashion those British requests or elements of the program which may have political implications.

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MI. C. ...
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Drafted: PM/AE:JTKendrick:bpw
7/8/71 x20620

Concurrences:
PM - Mr. Spiers
EUR - Mr. Hillenbrand
L/PM - Mr. Fields
U - Mr. Irwin

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By K.C. NARA Date 12/30/81

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

PM
AE 7/6/71

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TOP SECRET / NODIS July 2, 1971
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MEMORANDUM FOR:


Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
Thomas H. Moorer
Director, Central Intelligence Richard Helms

SUBJECT: US-UK Nuclear Relations: NSSM 123

Attached is the study on US-UK Nuclear Relations prepared by the Ad Hoc Group in response to NSSM 123.

In order to prepare for early decisions on this issue, may we please have written agency views on the paper, particularly the options, by close of business Thursday, July 8.

AE 1-12K-25


Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Attachment

cc: Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

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Authority NND969057
By K.C. NARA Date 12/30/81



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

JUN 30 1971

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RESTRICTED DATA

To: The Under Secretary
From: PM - Ronald I. Spiers

US-UK Nuclear Relations

Background

NSSM 123 (Tab D) called for a review of our nuclear relations with the UK, with particular emphasis on Super Antelope, a program to assure the survivability and penetrability of their Polaris system against Soviet ABM's. When the British request for assistance in this field first became known last February we outlined in a memorandum to you some of the approaching problems (Tab B). Subsequently Mr. Packard submitted to Dr. Kissinger a brief report on the program (Tab C). The attached draft report (Tab A) in response to NSSM 123 has been prepared by State, AEC, Defense and ACDA at the working level. It has, of course, not yet received policy level review and approval of the respective agencies. I intend to forward the report to the NSC staff in order that it can be scheduled at an early date for the SRG, at which time formal agencies views can be set forth.

Major Issues

The principle issue requiring an early decision is how we should respond to a UK request for technical advice and assistance in upgrading their Polaris system. They also want continued access to US underground nuclear tests in order to expose UK hardware samples, and possibly the use of US flight test facilities. The extent and nature of

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By K.C. NARA Date 12/30/81

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the assistance we are able to provide thus has both military and political significance.

Although the British are only asking our assistance through the Project Definition phase, it is probable that they will seek further US support of some kind in development, production, and testing, once they decide to proceed beyond Project Definition. Should they do so this would have important longer range implications for our relations with the British, the French, NATO and, insofar as it may have a bearing on SALT (we have previously considered the possibility of a "no transfer provision") on US-USSR relations. (While we in State do not believe that the SALT issue will be a major stumbling block with the Soviets, ACDA may well take a more jaundiced view of continuing US-UK cooperation.)

US-UK cooperation in the nuclear field has a long history and this most recent request of the British is but a continuation of past work and commitment in the field. As a practical matter all agencies agree, and the response to the NSSM makes clear, that we do not have a good alternative to continued technical assistance to Super Antelope. To refuse to go forward would cause a major change in US-UK relations which is not warranted. At the same time, the UK request does represent a new plateau in our relations. The British Government has made a decision to proceed with Super Antelope (up to this point, HMG has simple been exploring alternatives) and as suggested previously we may well find ourselves inextricably drawn into new and more far reaching efforts to assist her to keep her nuclear forces viable.

An examination of continued US-UK nuclear relations raises fundamental questions of how US interests are affected by the development of third country nuclear forces in Europe, and thus the direction of our future European nuclear policy. Assisting the British in Project Definition of Super Antelope will continue and solidify our relationship with them in the nuclear field. At the same time this cooperation may make it more difficult for the British to move toward a European Force, assuming it were in our mutual interest for them to

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By K.C. NARA Date 12/30/81 U

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do so. As long as Britain relies on our technology and assistance she is less likely to look to cooperative European efforts. In addition, we would have Congressional problems in permitting her to share technology gained from us with other NATO states.

The paper records a consensus of the Ad Hoc Group that:

-- it is not in the US interest to terminate abruptly the present cooperation with the British; to reverse our course would undoubtedly have a major adverse impact on our relations with the UK.

-- there are no compelling needs at this time for the US to develop a firm position on the question of a future European Nuclear Force. There are still too many imponderables before we can or should try to reach such a decision.

-- our interests would seem to be best served by pursuing a course which would give us the greatest assurance of being able to hedge any major decisions for several years. Such a course would presumably permit us to continue to cooperate discreetly with the UK on Project Definition of Super Antelope. (If our cooperation with the British were accompanied with too much fanfare it is conceivable that the SALT negotiations could be affected, as well as stimulate French second thoughts about UK integration into the European Community.)

For the above reasons we favor Option 2(a) of the report, which calls for a rather tight control on the cooperative projects and a low public visibility.

Several secondary but not unimportant issues, largely of an operational nature, emerged from this exercise. One is the degree to which State should appropriately be involved in the evolving nature of this relationship with the UK. Because of the potentially significant political implications we believe it essential to ensure that in

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By K.C. NARA Date 12/30/88

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future programs with the British we keep abreast of developments (coordination has not been adequate heretofore) in order that we are better able to assess the political consequences of particular proposed actions. We believe these assurances of coordination are written into the paper.

The second issue concerned the question of an approach to the British at the political level. HMG decided at the Ministerial level to proceed with Super Antelope and to ask for US assistance. Contact with the US has so far been limited to the defense technical level. While we agree that our formal reply should be made through defense channels we believe that the issue has political overtones. We accordingly have taken the position that, assuming the decision is made to continue cooperation, we should confirm to the British at the diplomatic level that an explicit governmental decision has been made to approve the British request. Not only would this underline that on our side we recognize the significance of the cooperation we are pursuing but it would also provide an opportunity for us to point out for the record that we assume the British realize we can accept no responsibility for success or failure, since we have not participated in the formulation of the project. (There is apparently still a reasonable doubt among our scientists about the merit of the British approach and a disjoinder of responsibility at this juncture might protect us from possible British ire in the event of a failure.) DOD was for a long time reluctant to have State discuss this matter in any form with the Foreign Office, but has now agreed to incorporate this point in the paper.

We would be glad to discuss the above issues with you prior to transmitting the paper to the NSC staff.

Attachments

(See attached sheet)

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By K.C. NARA Date 12/30/78

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Attachments:

- Tab A - NSSM 123 Response
- Tab B - Memorandum dated February 17
- Tab C - Letter from DepSecDef Packard
to Mr. Kissinger of March 25,
with Fact Sheet
- Tab D - NSSM 123, April 17

Drafted: PM/AE:JTKendrick:S/PC:SWeiss:bpw
6/30/71 x20620

Concurrences:

- EUR/BMI - Mr. Burns
- EUR/RPM - Mr. Humphreys

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By K.C. NARA Date 12/30/88

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TAB D

NSSM 123 Report

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By K.C. NARA Date 12/30/88

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 17, 1971

COPIES TO:

National Security Study Memorandum 123

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TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence


SUBJECT: US-UK Nuclear Relations

The President has directed that a study be prepared to review current issues of nuclear cooperation with Great Britain.

In particular, the study should address:

1. The extent to which we are already committed to assist the UK in improving its strategic nuclear force under existing agreements.
2. The implications of US assistance to the British in their efforts to improve the capability of their present Polaris systems through the "project definition phase."
3. The long run implications for the US of a deeper involvement in the UK effort to develop and deploy an improved Polaris system, including an assessment of British strategic objectives and a possible future UK request for MIRV technology.

This study will be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Political Military Group. The completed study, which will be considered by the Senior Review Group, should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs not later than May 10.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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