



# THE BLACK VAULT

This document was obtained from The Black Vault, an online database of declassified government documents. This particular record is housed in the MKULTRA/Mind Control Collection, a compilation of more than 20,000 pages declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The entire collection is free to download and online at:

**<http://mkultra.theblackvault.com>**

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

(242)

TO : Chief, Bio-Chemistry & Pharmacology Branch, DATE: 15 July 1953  
Medicine Division, OSI

FROM : Chief, Technical Branch, SO

SUBJECT: Attached

14th July  
7 year 1953

DOD  

1. Returned herewith are the letters and enclosures of 19 June 1953, reference [REDACTED]. Also returned is the letter prepared over the signature of [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] and the writer have examined the letter very carefully and believe that it excellently states the position of this Agency and quite properly suggests a joint undertaking along the lines discussed.

3. Both [REDACTED] and the writer hope that OSI representatives (probably [REDACTED]) at the coming ARTICOME meeting tomorrow, Thursday, 16 July 1953, will bring this very interesting problem up for general discussion since in our opinion it is of extreme interest to ARTICOME.

4. The writer discussed with [REDACTED] the proposal of a Foreign team from the ARTICOME group to carry on the work with the [REDACTED] officials. The writer told [REDACTED] he felt that a team composed of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would be fully equipped to cover all fields and to lay on preliminary work and discussions with the [REDACTED] officials. [REDACTED] concurred in this view entirely. Foreign

[REDACTED]/Att.

Chief, Security Research Staff

15 July 1953

Chief, Technical Branch

ARTICHOKE Conference, 16 June 1953

1. On Thursday, 18 June 1953, an ARTICHOKE Conference was held in the SO Conference Room, [redacted] from 2:00 to 4:00 PM. Present were [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] representing SO; [redacted] and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb representing TSC; [redacted] representing the Medical Staff and [redacted] representing the Director's Office and OSI. In addition, [redacted] who is specialassis-<sup>U.S.</sup>tant to [redacted] attended the conference as a special representative from DIA.

2. [redacted] opened the conference by introducing [redacted] as the representative from DIA.

3. A discussion was then held concerning the "Plastic" case in which [redacted] explained in general the details of the case to those present not familiar with it and brought the matter up to date insofar as ARTICHOKE interest was concerned. It was agreed the case had not been properly handled and that, in the future, important developments such as the "Plastic" case should be handled with great speed and, if necessary, a representative of the ARTICHOKE program should proceed to the area to obtain as soon as possible the best available information.

4. [redacted] then reported on the work being done in the field of narcotic and toxic mushrooms. [redacted] advised in this field there were very strong indications that certain mushrooms definitely affected the human mind and from a scientific point of view there was very little factual information available. [redacted] explained that arrangements had been made for the collection, cultivation, propagation and testing of certain poisonous and narcotic mushrooms by different agencies both governmental and private.

5. Following this, Dr. Gottlieb gave a very brief report on some of the activities of the special work carried on by [redacted] in California in which his division is materially interested and also commented on the work of the Army Chemical Corps in lines of interest to ARTICHOKE.

Classified

6. [REDACTED] commented concerning the fact that there are numerous drugs that affect the autonomic and central nervous system of the human being and suggested that it would perhaps not be wise to waste too much time in research along lines where there is little established information.

7. Following this, [REDACTED] explained that the literature on mushrooms clearly indicated that the Russians had used mushrooms for centuries for their narcotic effect, that drinks made of mushrooms had been used to produce intoxication in Russia and possibly have been used for other purposes. [REDACTED] also commented on the use of narcotic mushrooms by Mexican Indians in tribal ceremonies and in other interesting uses. Following this, there was a general discussion concerning mushrooms.

8. [REDACTED] pointed out that the proposed experimental work to be carried on in [REDACTED] had run into a security problem since one of the key men to be used in the project was involved in a current CIA investigation and that his office was bringing every pressure to bear on CIA to find out the results of their investigation and to find out whether we can use the individual involved [REDACTED].

9. [REDACTED] stated that his office was exploring the possibility of using similar setups or setups having good potentials.

10. [REDACTED] followed this up by stating that proposed work at [REDACTED] was probably cut on Security grounds as one of the key figures involved could not be security cleared.

11. [REDACTED] discussed the spreading out of the ARTICHOKE work and the ways and means by which ARTICHOKE was securing information and assistance. He stated at the present time we had cleared twenty to thirty top-level experts in certain scientific fields and perhaps thirty more were in the investigative mill that would be used in the future for contacts.

12. Following this, [REDACTED] discussed the Valley Forge question and stated that nothing of ARTICHOKE value had turned up at Valley Forge. He stated there was a chance ARTICHOKE techniques could be brought to bear in the future on a few of the "hardcore" cases, but these few cases would be scattered over the United States and he personally doubted if [REDACTED] would be interested in having these cases handled by ARTICHOKE methods. They

13. At this point, there was a general discussion concerning the so-called [redacted] and [redacted] reported that [redacted] had obtained [redacted] from [redacted] of the material which he then held. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was making every effort he could but, to date, [redacted] had been unable to obtain even the medical histories on the individuals involved and for this reason his work was proceeding very slowly. [redacted] stated that this represented a typical example of governmental red tape and the lack of action and co-ordination was possibly costing the United States Government a great deal of intelligence information.

14. [redacted] then stated that [redacted] report on certain victims of the poisoning whom he [redacted] had examined at [redacted] was now in [redacted] office and [redacted] stated that after [redacted] had finished with the report, he would make it available to [redacted].

15. Following this, there was a discussion on the handling of the [redacted] and all hands agreed that one of the weaknesses of the Agency apparently was the fact that there was a great deal of difficulty in getting factual information quickly from all sources.

16. [redacted] reported on some of the botanicals that had been obtained by [redacted]. [redacted] stated that the first work on some of these botanicals had shown some good results but that considerable work was still to be done before positive results could be obtained.

18. [redacted] then commented on the Eaves case which had appeared in the "U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT". [redacted] stated

that certain angles to the [redacted] and Hayes cases were similar in regard to their handling although they were handled thousand's of miles apart. It seemed significant that both were forced to testify against their friends and in [redacted] opinion this indicates that similar patterns and procedures seem to be employed by the Soviets and their satellites.

19. Following this, [redacted] commented on the very interesting angle that interrogations of the individuals who had come out of North Korea across the Soviet Union to freedom recently had apparently had a "blank" period or period of disorientation while passing through a special zone in Manchuria. [redacted] pointed out that this had occurred in all individuals in the party after they had had their first full meal and their first coffee on the way to freedom. [redacted] pointed out that [redacted] was attempting to secure further confirmatory facts in this matter since drugging was indicated.

20. At this point, there was a general discussion in connection with the development of AMICOME "Teams" and [redacted] explained that Team personnel were gradually being assembled. [redacted] pointed out that the chief of the team had been obtained for the [redacted] post. [redacted] then explained that a widespread effort was being made to find an especially equipped technician for the [redacted] post to team up with [redacted] who would be chief there. At this point, [redacted] asked for further clarification in regard to the teams and [redacted] then explained to [redacted] the composition of the teams and explained that the chief of the team or chief interrogator and the technician of the three-man team were to be furnished by SO and that the medical officer who is to be associated with the team is to be furnished by [redacted] as per prior agreement. [redacted] stated he did not know if [redacted] intended to draw up new medical officers for the teams or use medical officers in the field to associate with the team but that the doctors for the teams were now up to [redacted]

21. Following this, there was a brief discussion of the team proposal and [redacted] and [redacted] again discussed the entire overseas AMICOME program including the uses of the teams and how the teams tied in with the work overseas.

22. At this point, [redacted] stated that he had given the whole matter of testing of new chemicals and new techniques and methods a considerable amount of thought and

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

23. [REDACTED] stated that for a long time Security had felt that this procedure was too dangerous but with the drawing in of a number of men of great scientific capacity and with a record of very cautious work in the past, he felt this proposal could probably be successfully carried to the Director's Office. [REDACTED] suggested all members present consider this proposal and that it be discussed at the next meeting and suggestions and ideas along these lines be submitted. Following this, all [REDACTED] agreed if it were properly controlled and very cautiously handled, this suggestion had a great deal of merit and that a discussion on [REDACTED] proposal would certainly be warranted at the next meeting.

24. At the conclusion of the conference, [REDACTED] discussed the problem of brain washing and its relation to the ARTICOKE work. [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was making a certain exploratory effort in the overall field of "brain washing" and sources on brain washing material and in the near future we would have a report on that and its future relation to the ARTICOKE work.

25. The meeting adjourned at approximately 4:00 PM after Thursday, 16 July 1953 had been selected as the time of the next meeting. The meeting will be held as usual in the SO Conference Room.