
### Chapter 13

# CA Support to Special Operations

Successful CA operations, whether supporting SOF or GP forces, depend on the support of the populace. Most U.S. military operations occur in a LIC environment with the objective of winning popular support. CA units must therefore help other SOF mobilize this support, keeping in mind the impact of their activities on civilians. CMO are essential in LIC because of the dominance of nonviolent forces. Any enemy forces dispersed among the civilians must be engaged selectively. CA forces, as part of SOF, must remain politically attuned, regionally oriented, and linguistically capable of supporting SO.



#### SUPPORT OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

The proper use of CA assets in FID is essential during all phases of an insurgency to counter a resistance movement. When used to their full potential, CMO can be crucial in preventing the escalation of an insurgency to higher phases (Figure 13-1, page 13-2). Properly using CMO can reduce insurgent activities. A national development program can solidify the HN government's position and improve conditions for the people. CA activities vary with the capabilities of the host government and with the level of insurgent activity. The economic, social, and political situations are also major influences.

#### CA Role in FID

CA units conduct CMO that support the internal development of a FN. CA elements may support other

military forces and nonmilitary agencies but will always coordinate with the HN. CMO focus on the indigenous infrastructures and population in the operational areas. CA units provide optimum support to HN government and military in the execution of FID activities. CA elements provide experts in HA and populace control. Other CA elements provide medical and engineer advisory capabilities and civic action teams with additional assets. CA personnel supporting FID are assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising FID operations and to U.S. military advisory elements who train and aid HN military units. CA elements supporting FID-

 Review U.S. SA program goals and HN IDAD goals and plan CMO to support the HN plan.




Figure 13-1. Phases of insurgency.

- Plan CMO based on the three phases of insurgency as described in FMs 100-20 and 31-20.
- Train HN military how to plan, train for, and conduct MCA programs, PRC operations, and other CMO appropriate to the IDAD of their country.
- Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
- Identify specific CMO missions the HN military will conduct.

#### **CA Coordination**

When CA personnel support FID operations, they may also support civil administration missions with the HN government. They help HN military forces plan and conduct MCA. Since this support is part of the overall U.S. SA program, formal agreements between the HN and the United States govern CA activities. Cultural awareness and language proficiency are critical for those CA personnel who have frequent contacts with HN officials and citizens. Area expertise is essential for effective communication between U.S. and HN representatives.

#### SUPPORT OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

CA units support U.S. SF units in the conduct of UW. They provide advice and assistance relating to social, economic, and political considerations within the JSOA. The nature of UW limits the use of supporting CA units to outside the JSOA; however, certain CA personnel may accompany deploying SF units depending on mission requirements. The most important role of CA operations in UW is to support a swift transition of power from resistance forces to the legitimate government once hostilities end.

CA personnel support SF units with timely advice on the impact of proposed operations on the local populace within the JSOA. They also provide advice on the development of resistance organizations and the expansion of the JSOA by gaining and keeping popular support. CA specialists at the strategic level must have the political knowledge to support the planning and conduct of resistance operations. They must also be area oriented and qualified in functional areas. From the U.S. perspective, the intent of UW is to develop and sustain resistance organizations and synchronize their activities to further U.S. national security objectives. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on politico-military objectives.

#### CA Role in UW

CA units conduct planning and training activities. They also conduct missions that support SF and other SOF. Initial CA support to deploying SOF focuses on training SOF personnel in CA. CA support also includes advising SOF personnel of social, economic, cultural, religious, and political considerations that they

must understand before infiltration. Qualified CA specialists may accompany SF elements on their infiltration. Normally, CA personnel remain at the SFOBs until the situation within the JSOA is stable enough to support deployment of tactical CA elements. CA personnel can be infiltrated during resupply operations. CA elements are required during linkup with other forces, if not sooner. The SF group or battalion S5 exercises staff control and performs required coordination. CA teams or units advise on or administer DC camp operation next to the JSOA in friendly nations. These camps can serve as recruiting and training bases for UW operations.

#### Planning for the JSOA

UW operational success depends on many factors. The most important is the support of the populace. Without active popular support, the UW mission will fail. Planners must consider the steps needed to mobilize the populace to support the resistance. They must also consider the physical and psychological impact of resistance or U.S. unilateral operations on civilians. CA units perform tasks that complement SF operations. They train resistance military and political elements in techniques to motivate and mobilize the populace's support of the resistance movement. This support must extend through the period in which victory has been achieved and a new government is trying to maintain internal stability.

#### **Training for CA Personnel**

Personnel in CA units should train extensively with the SF elements they will support in conflict. Training

should emphasize infiltration, isolation, and organization of the auxiliary and underground as well as basic soldier skills. CA personnel who have not received cross-training in SF techniques should not be infiltrated into the JSOA unless the resistance is well-developed and located in relatively secure areas.

#### **CA Training for SF Personnel**

The supporting CA element trains, advises, and assists deploying SF teams in CMO. The element also advises the teams of the political, economic, social, and cultural factors they must understand before deploying to the JSOA. CA planning and training for UW must consider the following factors:

- The theater CINC'S politico-military mission (for example, restore the government-in-exile) and its effect on the resistance organization during and after hostilities.
- The strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and likely intentions of the hostile political organization.
- Likely hostile countermeasures to isolate the resistance organization physically or psychologically from the local populace.
- Resistance activities that the hostile political organization can exploit to neutralize U.S. support or mobilize world opinion against the resistance organization.
- Organization and potential development of the resistance organization.
- The political, social, economic, and security needs of the various segments of the local populace.

#### **CA Support of Postconflict Operations**

CA support of postconflict operations depends on environmental factors that affect the work load and method of operations. The missions CA units perform at the end of hostilities determine the specific CA specialties required. CA postconflict missions support GP forces, SOF, and civil administration. During the demobilization phase, CA elements help demobilize

the guerrilla force. They also help the transition of this force into the nation's new paramilitary forces.

The end of military operations marks the start of new challenges for CA forces. These challenges include encounters with the resistance forces and the local populace as they respond to a new government. A new way of life also poses special problems and challenges. Problems may involve the hopes and aspirations of the resistance movement. Its leaders justifiably feel they legitimately can demand recognition and status equal to their part in the struggle. The resistance force is dealt with in varying manners, each presenting a variety of problems for CA. Complete demobilization of the former resistance force could take place with its members returned to civilian pursuits. Demobilization of the resistance force involves the collection of their weapons. Collection is difficult unless the resistance force receives assurances of jobs and proper resettlement. CA personnel help by locating jobs or providing training. During this period, CA personnel locate or help provide construction of adequate housing in areas of the country acceptable to the resistance force personnel. CA civil information specialists aid this transition by publicizing the resistance personnel's contributions and by coordinating for proper awards and decorations.

The former resistance force might become an element or the entire structure of the new nation's paramilitary and military forces. If this occurs, the need for CA personnel to locate jobs and adequate shelter for resistance force personnel may cease. Placing former resistance force personnel into the new nation's paramilitary and military may also help because of their visibility and potential use in meeting the population's postconflict needs. Meeting these needs is critical if the new government is to remain credible.

## FID Activities After UW or Conventional Operations

The emergence of a new government after hostilities can be a difficult and perhaps along-term process. CA personnel must be ready to support government functions for varying times to ensure stability. The object is to train and emplace local nationals to direct and staff the government agencies as soon as possible.

#### **Resistance Force and National Stability**

The new government's military and paramilitary forces can help the civilian agencies meet the populace's needs.

CA personnel can help the military and paramilitary units work with the people to complete civic action projects designed to meet the people's needs.

#### SUPPORT TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Narrowly defined, SA is activity pursuant to a body of laws that authorize and control the entire process. Some of these laws are the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and related amendments. Considered more properly as a strategic element, SA is a primary tool of U.S. foreign policy. It has application across the operational continuum. It is a bridge that links collective security with U.S. friends and allies in times of peace and crisis.

When the United States provides SA to a HN, a primary concern is the HN's ability to plan and manage its defense resources by and for itself. HN military organizations may never develop this ability if they continue to request help in areas where they have already become efficient.

#### The Role of the MAAG

Where the SA mission of the MAAG includes support of FID, the chief of the MAAG must consider CA activities of the HN forces. CA assets may provide assistance to H/CA and MCA. They assist HN forces conducting the following activities:

- Minimization of civilian interference with military operations.
- PRC.
- Assistance in government functions.
- MCA.
- Community relations.
- Civil defense.
- Reconstruction.
- Cultural affairs.
- Relief activities.
- Support of dependents.
- National resources development.
- Labor assistance to agriculture and industry.
- Self-supported activities for the military.

#### MAAG CA Responsibilities

MAAG personnel with CA responsibilities must ensure that each in-country CA-related program involving other U.S. agencies is covered by a policy directive from the COM. This directive will be binding upon all members of the country team. It should specify the goals of the program and the responsibilities and support that each agency is expected to provide. MAAG personnel must emphasize H/CA and MCA. They must ensure CA is given adequate staff representation throughout the U.S. command and advisory structure. They must also encourage indigenous forces to have CA staff sections at all levels.

#### **CA Mobile Training Teams**

MTTs provide training that is beyond the capability of in-country U.S. military assistance elements. ARs 12-5 and 12-7 and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Program Handbook contain detailed information on MTTs.

The main purpose of a CA MTT is to develop HN CA expertise and training capabilities in a particular CA function. The training improves the HN CA capability by educating specialists to further train their people to conduct MCA.

MTTs may be used during any phase of an insurgency (refer to Figure 13-1, page 13-2). They usually operate directly under the MAAG.

CA units assigned and attached to the unified command or those from USSOCOM normally provide the CA MTTs. HN needs must be assessed prior to forming the MTT. Team members must be qualified in those specialties required by the MTT mission.

In FID, CA MTT are normally concerned with—

- Agriculture.
- Animal husbandry.
- Communications.

- Community development.
- Economics and commerce.
- Education
- Public health.

- Public information.
- Public safety.
- Public works.
- Sanitation.

#### SUPPORT IN COMBATTING TERRORISM

Public Law 92-539 assigns primary, concurrent jurisdiction and overall responsibility to the FBI for the direction of operations to counter certain criminal acts committed in the United States. Congress felt the need for the federal government's involvement in situations where international repercussions may be felt or when the incident may impact on U.S. relations. The FBI may need specialized military protective-type equipment or weaponry and technical support personnel. By agreement between the DOJ and the DOD, appropriate DOD components will respond to all reasonable FBI requests for resources including materiel, facilities, and personnel. DOD personnel will act in a technical advisory but not a law enforcement capacity in combatting acts of terrorism. The SECDEF extended the Secretary of the Army's designation as executive agent for civil disturbance matters to cover the employment of military resources in support of the FBI.

#### **Responsibility for Combatting Terrorism**

In addition to the FBI, other government agencies have areas of responsibility in combatting terrorism. The Army's role (and any resulting CMO) is to support the "lead agency." Individual agencies and the armed services are responsible for their own AT programs. For example, the DOJ or FBI is the lead agency in dealing with acts of terrorism committed within the United States, its territories, and possessions. The FAA is the lead agency for enforcing laws that affect the safety of persons aboard aircraft.

The DOS is the lead agency for any U.S. response to terrorist acts against U.S. personnel and facilities in foreign countries. CA activities involved in combatting terrorism may include—

 Establishing and maintaining liaison, when required, with the government lead agency. MP units may provide liaison to the FBI because of their law enforcement nature.

- Implementing civil-military countermeasures that reduce the probability of attacks against military installations, units, and personnel.
- Coordinating and conducting civil information campaigns.
- Assisting PSYOP efforts in support of AT operations.
- Providing collateral intelligence support.
- Helping foreign governments implement and manage PRC.
- Training and assisting friendly and allied civil authorities in AT programs. Training police organizations, domestic and foreign, requires DA approval. Restrictions to some forms of training exist. Legal advice and coordination must occur before training police organizations.
- Working with country team(s) to develop neighboring government support.
- Supporting political, social, and cultural indoctrination of personnel deploying to foreign countries.
- Providing linguists to military units and other agencies.

#### **Antiterrorism**

AT includes all measures that installations, units, and individuals take to reduce the probability of their falling victim to a terrorist act. AT includes those defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property. These measures vary based on assessments of the local threat. These measures include personnel awareness and knowledge of personal protection techniques. They also include crime prevention and physical security programs to "harden" the target, making Army installations and personnel less appealing as terrorist targets. CA forces participate in their own AT programs and support the

AT programs of other units or agencies by planning and conducting CMO as requested.

#### Counterterrorism

CT includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

CT measures-preemption, intervention, or retaliation with specialized forces operating under direction of the NCA—have the characteristics of strikes or raids. CMO conducted in combatting terrorism consider the SO imperatives.

#### SUPPORT TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PKO support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain the peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. Such operations take place with the consent of the belligerent parties involved to maintain a negotiated truce and to help achieve a diplomatic resolution. The United States may participate in PKO under the

auspices of an international organization, in cooperation with the countries, or unilaterally. PKO may take many forms.

CA operations conducted during PKO are based on the provisions of the CA agreement and SOFAs between all parties.

#### **COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS**

CD operations involve measures taken to disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drug activities. The level of violence used by the drug infrastructure dictates the increased use of military and paramilitary force in CD operations. A 1981 amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act (Chapter 18, USC, Section 1385) authorizes specific DOD assistance in CD activities. The primary SOF role in this interagency activity is to support U.S. and HN CD efforts abroad. CA support operations include the fundamental CA support activities to SOF and GP forces conducting CD operations. CMO and support to civil administration are the basic CA operations that support CD activities. For more information, see Chapters 10 and 11.

#### **CA Strategy for CD Operations**

CA strategy must go beyond crop substitution to alternative development projects and income opportunities. CA must consider the economic power of the drug trafficker in the region, education of the local populace, and social problems. CA must help synchronize the military (HN and U. S.) with the civilian populace and tie in programs to support all time while making sure the credit goes to the HN and its government's actions. CA strategy depends on the following conditions, which are beyond total U.S. control:

- Willingness of HN to become actively involved.
- Perception by the "people" that the CD program is an initiative of the host government.

- Long-term, sustained U.S. commitment to the program.
- A continuing presence of HN government officials with the people in outlying areas for verification of their support to the program.

#### CA Role in Education

Education is the cornerstone of a sound CD program. The best way to approach the education process is to first get the total support of the government. HN officials should take the lead in implementing antidrug education campaigns primarily in the schools. Other efforts could be attempted with personnel responsible for organized sports events or entertainment activities, social or religious groups. CA elements can give seminars on CD programs to help the HN officials in their education process.

The small farmer or the family is the key for successful CD programs in developing countries. CA elements must help the HN develop alternative sources of income to replace peasant income lost by not producing illicit drug crops. This project is very difficult and one the CA community is continuously striving to resolve. Although there are some solutions or ideas such as continuous aid, the church buying cash crops from the farmers, and possibly the government subsidizing the farmer, the problem has no surefire answers.

### CD Operations as Part of Contingency Operations

CA assets participating in military CD operations as part of contingency operations in LIC support bilateral cooperative programs that the U.S. ambassador or COM approves. Their aim is reducing the supply, demand, and trafficking of illicit drugs. This support involves technical advice and assistance to HN authorities on developing alternative cash production

crops. Another role is to assess HN CD capabilities and to reinforce psychological actions supporting informational programs. These programs publicize positive aspects of HN education and prevention programs, change attitudes towards drugs, and discredit drug producers and traffickers. Also, CA elements provide incidental intelligence support to CD efforts through contacts with HN personnel.

#### NATION ASSISTANCE

Nation assistance describes the type of support CA provides to promote HN development and growth. The goal of nation assistance is long-term regional stability, pluralistic governments, sound democratic institutions, viable economies, and the means for orderly change. Activities conducted during nation assistance should address the causes of instability. The aim is to preclude the need for U.S. military intervention to counteracts of violence. DOD, working in concert with other U.S. agencies and at the HN's request, provides health, technical, management, and other assistance consistent with legislation to achieve the desired goals. Because of their missions and force structure, CA units have unique capabilities to coordinate nation assistance and supporting activities.

CA units and personnel can also provide the vehicle for abetter understanding of the culture of the HN. A cultural understanding of the HN will only enhance the U.S. position toward that end. For more information on nation assistance, see Chapter 8.

#### **HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

The objective of HA is to serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the HN and at the same time promote the support of the HN civilian leadership. HA encompasses the following programs:

- Disaster relief.
- NEO.

Depending on the extent of a nation assistance program, CA forces coordinate with the following USG agencies:

- USAID.
- USIS.
- DOT.
- USDA.
- DOC.
- DEA.

Nation assistance programs must be coordinated with the ambassador's overall country plan and the unified commander's theater plan. Other military forces that can be employed in nation assistance programs include—

- Engineer units.
- Medical personnel.
- Aviation units.
- MP units.
- Other SOF.
- H/CA.
- Nation assistance.
- DC operations.

Title 10, USC, is the permanent authority for H/CA. For more information on HA, see Chapter 10.